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The Legal Design for Parenting
Concussion Risk
Katharine Silbaugh*
This Article addresses a question as yet unexplored in the emerging
concussion risk literature: how does the statutorily assigned parental role
in concussion risk management conceptualize the legal significance of the
parent, and does it align with other areas of law that authorize and limit
parental risk decision-making? Parents are the centerpiece of the “Lystedt”
youth concussion legislation in all fifty states, and yet the extensive legal
literature about that legislation contains no discussion of parents as legal
actors and makes no effort to situate their statutory role into the larger legal
framework of parental authority. This Article considers the Lystedt
framework from the perspective of other law engaging parental authority
and parental decision-making, placing Lystedt’s parental role in that larger
family law framework. That lens reveals that the Lystedt legislation may be
using the cultural capital of parental authority to shield youth athletic
leagues from having to fully grapple with concussion risk. Under the Lystedt
framework, parents are unwittingly functioning as an impediment to safety
improvements, shielding athletic associations from conventional pressures
to improve. The operation of Lystedt is in this way a departure from related
areas of law that set boundaries on parental authority to accept risk of
injury on behalf of a child, including limitations on the enforcement of
parental waivers of liability. Finally, Lystedt unrealistically elevates
parental responsibility without adequately providing parents the capacity
and opportunity to be effective protectors of their children’s welfare. I argue
that in a time of intense cultural ambivalence about concussion risk in
athletics, the rich concept of parental authority is expropriated in the
Lystedt concussion statutes to avoid threats to the structure of youth sports
that would otherwise be vulnerable to pressures to change in order to reduce
* Copyright © 2019 Katharine Silbaugh. Professor of Law and Law Alumni Scholar,
Boston University. I would like to thank Gabriela Aroca, Chloe Aubuchon, and Lauren
Bentlage for excellent research assistance, and Gary Lawson, Mike Harper, Wendy
Kaplan, Alexi Lahav, and the Connecticut faculty workshop participants for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
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concussion risk. The NFL lobbied states to adopt this legislation, under
which parents function to preserve the status quo.
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INTRODUCTION
A concussion is a traumatic brain injury caused by a blow, bump, or
jolt to the head or body.1 Over the past decade, all fifty states have
enacted “Lystedt” legislation to address an expanded understanding of
concussion frequency and of the long-term negative outcomes
associated with concussions (more accurately termed traumatic brain
injuries).2 Lystedt laws focus on educating athletes, coaches, and
parents about the signs that an athlete may have suffered a concussion
and the need to keep a concussed athlete out of play until she is cleared
by a medical professional. A legal literature has emerged evaluating the
limitations and efficacy of these laws in reducing the risk to athletes, as
well as the array of litigation in professional and collegiate sports over
harms already incurred.3
1 TBI: Get the Facts, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
traumaticbraininjury/get_the_facts.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
2 See Patricia Guthrie, Ex Youth Football Player: You Could End Up Like Me, WEBMD
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20151021/concussion-zacklystedt#1 (explaining that Washington State resident Zachary Lystedt suffered two
football concussions at age 13 that even ten years later leave him walking with a cane
and suffering with debilitating short-term memory loss and speech impediment).
3 See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, Concussion Safety in Children’s Sports: A Central Role
for the “Power of the Permit,” 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2015); Taylor Adams, Comment,
The Repercussions of Concussions in Youth Football Leagues: An Analysis of Texas’s
Concussion Law and Why Reform Is Necessary, 18 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC.
JUST. 285, 344 (2016); Erin P. Andrews, Note, Avoiding the Technical Knockout: Tackling
the Inadequacies of Youth Concussion Legislation, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 421-22
(2013/2014); Roy G. Beran, Concussion - A Question of Negligence, 36 MED. & L. 121,
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From many quarters in our political economy, we have experienced
a reallocation of risk from institutions to individuals and families,
ranging from the defined contribution insurance plan to the shift in
social welfare benefits under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

128 (2017); Jayce Born, Note, National Protection of Student-Athlete Mental Health: The
Case for Federal Regulation over the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 92 IND. L.J.
1221, 1245 (2017); Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion
Management in Youth Sports, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 28, 53 (2013); Andrew W.
Breck, Note, Keeping Your Head on Straight: Protecting Indiana Youth Athletes from
Traumatic Brain Injuries Through “Return-to-Play” Legislation, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 215
(2012); Kirstie Brenson, Comment, Head to Head: The NFL Concussion Scandal and an
Argument for OSHA Regulation, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 595, 626 (2017); Tracey B. Carter,
It Is a Mindboggling Dilemma: To Play or Not to Play Youth Sports Due to Concussion Risks,
67 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2018); P. Chrisman et al., Implementation of Concussion
Legislation and Extent of Concussion Education for Athletes, Parents, and Coaches in
Washington State, 42 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1190, 1195 (2014); Sam C. Ehrlich, Gratuitous
Promises: Overseeing Athletic Organizations and the Duty to Care, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 1, 48-49 (2018); Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 66, 105 (2014); Samuel D. Hodge Jr. & Jack E. Hubbard,
Depression: The Often Overlooked Sequela of Head Trauma, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 31, 6768 (2017); Theresa S. Kim, Tackling Head Injuries in Youth and Interscholastic Football
with NFL Contract Reform, 24 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 93 (2017); Sungwon Kim et al.,
Legislative Efforts to Reduce Concussions in Youth Sports: An Analysis of State Concussion
Statutes, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORTS 162 (2017); Chris Lau, Note, Leaders and Laggards:
Tackling State Legislative Responses to the Youth Sports Concussion Epidemic, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2879, 2912 (2017); Bryant Lee, Note, Knocked Unconscionable: College Football
Scholarships and Traumatic Brain Injury, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 643-44 (2017);
Kerri M. Lowrey et al., Do Ethics Demand Evaluation of Public Health Laws? Shifting
Scientific Sands and the Case of Youth Sports-Related Traumatic Brain Injury Laws, 19 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 99 (2016); Kerry M. Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State
Experiences Implementing Youth Sports Concussion Laws: Challenges, Successes, and
Lessons for Evaluating Impact, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 290-96 (2014); Michael
Meyers, Note, Utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution to Foster Comprehensive Traumatic
Brain Injury Research, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 905, 929 (2017); David E.
Missirian, Student Athlete Concussions: The Often Overlooked Legal and Ethical Minefield,
6 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 47 (2017); Stephanie A. Murray, Note, The Misnomer
of the NFL’s “Concussion Crisis”: Don’t Count on the NFL to Solve Football’s Biggest
Problem - and OSHA Regulation May Not Save the Game Either, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 181,
214-15 (2017); Francis X. Shen, Are Youth Sports Concussion Statutes Working?, 56 DUQ.
L. REV. 8, 9 (2018); Lance K. Spaude, Comment, Time to Act: Correcting the Inadequacy
of Youth Concussion Legislation Through a Federal Act, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1094 (2017);
Marie-France Wilson, Youth Athletes at Risk: Preventing and Managing Consequences of
Sports Concussions in Young Athletes and the Related Legal Issues, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
241, 288 (2010); see also Adam M. Finkel et al., The NFL as a Workplace: The Prospect
of Applying Occupational Health and Safety Law to Protect NFL Workers, 60 ARIZ. L. REV.
291, 367-68 (2018).
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to the risks associated with educational debt.4 One legal scholar
observes:
Western society has not only embraced risk as a useful
conceptual framework, but has also embraced risk as a matter
of social policy. Governments, large employers, and other big
institutions that used to spread risks are encouraging and
sometimes requiring individuals to embrace the actual risks that
they encounter in their lives. Across Western society,
governments and other big institutions are to a degree cutting
people loose from social structures that spread risk, exposing
individuals to more risk, making them more individually
responsible — all in the name of creating a more dynamic,
entrepreneurial, and creative society.5
The structure of concussion legislation reflects this trend. This Article
is the first to offer scrutiny of the implicit theory by which it operates:
that parents can become informed about the shifting scientific
landscape around concussion and use that information to make
effective and legitimate risk decisions on behalf of their children. This
Article addresses a question unexplored in the concussion law
literature: how does the parental role assigned under the Lystedt
framework conceptualize the legal significance of the parent, and does
that concept align with other areas of law that authorize and limit
parental risk decision-making? I conclude that the Lystedt framework
shifts more authority to parents to assume risk on behalf of a child than
is typical under existing legal justifications, and further, that parents’
temperament and skills in the youth sports context are particularly illsuited to their elevated authority. Judging from its structure and
operation, Lystedt legislation does not appear to elevate parental
authority out of respect for parents’ efficacy, but instead because parents
are the essential tool in the transfer of risk away from organizations and
to children.
In engineering for safety, the hierarchy is design, guard, and then
warn.6 We try first to develop an alternative design that reduces risk.
4 Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 562
(2008); Jonathan Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
1561, 1563 (2015).
5 Baker, supra note 4, at 562.
6 Kenneth R. Laughery & Michael S. Wogalter, The Safety Hierarchy and Its Role in
Safety Decisions, in ADVANCES IN HUMAN FACTORS, ERGONOMICS, AND SAFETY IN
MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 1010, 1010 (Karwowski & Salvendy eds., 2010)
(“The safety hierarchy, or hazard control hierarchy, is a priority scheme for dealing with
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When that is not feasible, we guard against the risk through physical
barriers. When that is not feasible, we warn users and rely on human
behavior modification or personal risk preference. Feasibility drives the
movement down the hierarchy.7
When regulating, we deem some risks so serious that they cannot be
left to warnings alone. Individuals may not prescribe themselves
oxycodone. In many states, individuals must protect their heads with a
helmet when riding a motorcycle, regardless of personal risk
preference.8 Although no state requires adults to wear a helmet when
riding a bicycle, in many states, a child must wear a helmet when riding
a bicycle, regardless of her parent’s risk preferences.9 Employers may
not employ ten-year-olds, even with parental consent.10
In regulation, as distinct from engineering and design, whether we
choose to prohibit or warn doesn’t always appear to be based on the
risk-reward calculation, or feasibility. Instead, warning in place of redesign can sometimes result from other forces. For example, economic
power and the distribution of benefits from risk allocation can influence
whether we redesign or simply warn. Consider tobacco: as a result of an
industry’s economic strength and path dependence, we regulate by
warning even though design thinking alone would likely point us in a
different direction.
Economic power isn’t the only thing that shapes or diverts regulation.
Cultural ambivalence can as well. At times of awkward cultural
contradiction, where the intangible values in the risk balance are
unstable, we sometimes begin regulating with warnings and
information rather than with redesign, leaving risk choice to the warned
and informed individual.11 We might endeavor to improve the decisionmaking of the individual by providing both information and awareness
product hazards. It is often referred to as the design, guard and warn sequence.”); see
also Marc Green, Safety Hierarchy: Design vs. Warnings, VISUAL EXPERT,
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/safetyhierarchy.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
7 See sources cited supra note 6.
8 Motorcycle Helmet Use Laws, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA
INST., https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/helmetuse/mapmotorcyclehelmets (last
visited Feb. 8, 2019).
9 Pedestrians and Bicyclists, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA
INST., https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/pedestrians-and-bicyclists/topicoverview (last
visited Feb. 8, 2019); State-by-State Helmet Laws Guide to Motorcycle Helmet Laws,
CONSUMER REPS., https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2011/06/state-by-stateguide-to-motorcycle-helmet-laws/index.htm (last updated July 4, 2014).
10 See Youth & Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/
youthlabor (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
11 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-7 (2008) (calling this “libertarian paternalism”).
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of decision moments that might otherwise be governed by inertia,12 but
the awkward cultural contradiction will be resolved by individuals until
greater stability in the relevant social values emerges.
With respect to concussion risk in youth sports, our times have
yielded just that strategy: provide information but do not prohibit risks.
We live in an era of cultural disagreement about concussion risk in
youth sports — about weighing the relative health, enjoyment, and
character values of risky sports to a child against the risk of serious,
sometimes lifelong, and sometimes fatal brain injury.13 While the
science is still evolving, the negative side of this balance is coming into
sharper focus with improved understanding of the gravity of traumatic
brain injury (concussion). Assigning weight to the positive side is
relatively more open to debate. We also see significant economic
interests in professional sports that may influence regulators toward the
status quo.
How well does well-informed consent resolve the concussion risk
exposure when the players are minors? Surely the potential devastation
of a brain injury must warrant as much focused informed, meaningful
consent for youth players as it does for adults, especially since the risk
of permanent harm is greater when concussion occurs in younger
athletes.14 In other contexts of this type of cultural ambivalence, the way
we treat minors is instructive. We sometimes prohibit risky behaviors
for youth — drinking, smoking, riding a bicycle without a helmet,
participating in the workforce, sexual conduct — even when we allow
adults to exercise choice about those risks for themselves. We deem
minors too immature to reason properly about health and safety risks
in those contexts, and parental judgment inadequate to cover for either
childhood immaturity or third party pressures when the risks at stake
are to a child’s long-term health and safety. When the value of a risk is
in dispute, it is not uncommon to allow adults to choose a risk for
themselves, while prohibiting parents from choosing the risk for their
children.
But at this time, we are still framing youth sports concussion risk as
a freedom or a permissible choice. One recent example of this framing
within the legal academy captures perfectly the rhetorical power of
12

Id.; see also Baker, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Albert Samaha, Opinion, The Kids Who Still Need Football, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/opinion/sunday/football-kidsbrain-damage.html.
14 See Ramadevi Pullela et al., Traumatic Injury to the Immature Brain Results in
Progressive Neuronal Loss, Hyperactivity and Delayed Cognitive Impairments, 28 DEV.
NEUROSCIENCE 396, 396-97 (2006).
13

University of California, Davis

204

[Vol. 53:197

information and choice as a mechanism for managing cultural
contradiction around concussion:
Such contrasting views make it difficult for policymakers to
know what, exactly, to do. The policy challenge going forward
is thus to facilitate accurate communication of risks and benefits
to allow for informed athlete and parent decision-making.15
The author of this statement aims to evaluate the efficacy of the Lystedt
laws at conveying information. But in order to evaluate that policy
framework, we need to consider not only the efficacy of parental
education, but the rationale for parental judgment in this context.
Moreover, we need to compare risk communication to more direct
incentive for design improvements, before we can decide that parental
consent and the Lystedt structure is an adequate method of
safeguarding children’s brains. When we view Lystedt as an effort to
reduce the worst risks caused by concussions, which is exposure to a
subsequent concussion before a first concussion is healed, the rationale
for its structure may be defensible. But when we view Lystedt in
comparison to the background law limiting parental ability to choose
health and safety risks for a child, Lystedt is much harder to defend.
Indeed, Lystedt’s conception of parental authority departs from existing
law in related areas, and in so doing, reduces incentives toward safer
design.
This Article expands the Lystedt literature to situate Lystedt in the
existing law governing parental waiver of liability in particular. A
substantial majority of states refuse to enforce pre-injury waivers of
liability signed by parents on behalf of their children. The rationale
underlying the law of parental waivers constructs parental judgment as
too flawed to address both a minor’s interests in appropriately managed
risk, and third parties’ efforts to commandeer parental authority for the
purpose of shifting risk from institutions to children. Yet the Lystedt
infrastructure is substantially dependent on that same nexus of
judgment and interests in a context that is particularly mismatched to
parental skill.
For a number of reasons, parents make bad decision-makers about
children’s concussion risk. Parents struggle with the technical difficulty
of comprehending concussion prevalence, symptoms, and
consequences. The Lystedt’s focus on post-concussion instructions
obscures the underlying decision to confront a primary risk of incurring
the first concussion. The information mandates do not include
15

Shen, supra note 3.
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conveying the likelihood of a first concussion or the fact that many
Lystedt statutes provide coaches and schools with immunity from
ordinary negligence liability.16 The focus on the need to remove an
athlete from play immediately if signs of concussion appear are
particularly ineffective when directed toward parents, as distinct from
coaches, because parents are not necessarily present when the injury
occurs. Finally, parents are not at their best in the youth sports context.
Both research and common experience indicate that parents have a
propensity toward strong personal emotions in the youth sports context
that impair their skill at making a decision on behalf of another person.17
Research demonstrates that parents are susceptible to the unique
cultural force of sport in society; they are too much a part of it to serve
as a check on it.18 Where that kind of emotion or role confusion is seen
in other contexts, the legal system ordinarily responds by constraining
parental authority. The gravity of consenting to the risk of a nebulous
lifelong injury for another person deserves our attention. The concept of
the parent, I argue, is deployed to protect the status quo, and to
postpone more systematic and expert design thinking that could reduce
overall risk.
Part I explores the cultural contradictions surrounding football, to
clarify the characteristics of our risk ambivalence. Part II describes the
problem of traumatic brain injury (concussion), sorting through
estimates of its prevalence in youth athletes and then describing its
consequences. Part III describes the Lystedt legislation, and then recasts
it as an imitation of an informed consent framework. Part IV explores
the law of parental authority and its rationales, with a particular focus
on parental waivers of liability for negligence, and explores the
interaction between waiver law and the Lystedt statutes. Part V
considers the special attributes of the youth sports parent, and then
critiques the Lystedt’s information framework in light of the problem of
youth sports parents. It concludes that unless risky contact sports are

16 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2013) (“Any athletic coach, official involved in
an athletic activity, or volunteer who fails to remove a person from a youth athletic
activity . . . is immune from civil liability for any injury resulting from that omission
unless it constitutes gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”).
17 See discussion infra Part V.
18 See discussion infra Part V; see, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald, Are Parents Ruining
Youth Sports? Fewer Kids Play Amid Pressure, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/are-parents-ruining-youth-sports-fewer-kidsplay-amid-pressure/2015/10/04/eb1460dc-686e-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html?
utm_term=.d21eb93477e6.
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prohibited entirely for minors,19 the choice architecture needs
substantial improvement to adequately inform parents and youth
athletes of the consequences of exposure to heightened concussion risk.
In addition, the Article suggests that the current legislative structure
actually impedes overall risk reduction by reducing redesign pressure
from insurers on sports and disarming parents from effective
participation in that redesign process.
I.

CULTURAL CONUNDRUM: FOOTBALL, DESTRUCTION,
ENTERTAINMENT

On September 28, 2018, 16-year-old Dylan Thomas of Zebulon,
Georgia, fell in the third quarter of a high school football game. Though
he needed help standing up, he was able to respond to questions, but
later lost consciousness.20 He died two days later from traumatic brain
injury, or what we commonly call concussion.21 In October of 2017, 16year-old Carlos Sanchez of Phoenix, Arizona died after suffering a
concussion trying to complete a block in a football game.22 A few years
earlier, 16-year-old Chad Stover lost his life to concussion playing in a
high school football game on Halloween night in Tipton, Missouri.23 On
September 11, 2015, 16-year-old Ben Hamm went for a tackle on a
kickoff return, taking a hit that was described as not unusual and not
bigger than others.24 He died several days later. In October of 2015, 1719 Bennett Omalu, Don’t Let Kids Play Football, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/opinion/dont-let-kids-play-football.html. (arguing
that child welfare requires the prohibition of contact football for minors); see also Chris
Hemond, Hockey Concussion: Is it Child Abuse? 184 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 861 (2012) (raising
the same argument for hockey).
20 Justin Baxley, ‘An anomaly.’ Reports Detail Pike County Football Player Dylan
Thomas’ Cause of Death, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2018, 9:56 PM), https://www.macon.com/
news/local/community/houston-peach/article219742730.html; Adrianne Haney &
Michael King, High School Football Player in Georgia Dies Sunday From Injuries Sustained
in Friday Game, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/highschool/2018/10/01/georgia-high-school-football-player-dylan-thomasdies/1485428002/.
21 Baxley, supra note 20.
22 Joshua R. Miller, Arizona High School Football Player Died Blocking on Play, N.Y.
POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/10/31/arizona-high-schoolfootball-player-died-blocking-on-play/.
23 Sean Gregory, Football’s Ultimate Cost: The Chad Stover Story, TIME (Sept. 18,
2014), http://time.com/3394893/football-brain-injury-chad-stover/.
24 Paighten Harkins, Wesleyan Christian School High School Football Player Dies After
Injury, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.tulsaworld.com/communities/
bartlesville/wesleyan-christian-school-high-school-football-player-dies-after-injury/article_
604c55cf-26f0-5fba-8c18-f4f3f1e93521.html; Kalyn Kahler & Dan Greene, The Game’s
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year-old Kenney Bui of Seattle died of a traumatic brain injury after
stepping off of the football field seeming dazed.25 In Chicago, 17-yearold Andre Smith died from a hit to the head in a high school game later
that same month.26 In November of 2015, 17-year-old Luke Schemm
died of a traumatic brain injury from a shoulder-to-shoulder hit taken
as he was scoring a conversion.27 In that particularly bad year of 2015
alone, thirteen high school students died playing football, at least six
due to traumatic brain injury (concussion).28 This is not a
comprehensive list of recent high school football deaths. According to
the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), in 2017, 2.5 million high
school students experienced concussions, a number significantly higher
than previous reports that had been based on emergency room visits or
based on only students who had lost consciousness.29 The CDC reports
that an average of 2.4 high school students die each season from
football-induced traumatic brain injury.30 Death is a rare concussion
outcome, but the 2.5 million high school students who suffer a
concussion each year experience a range of other cognitive, physical,
and emotional deficits, and for many these will be long-term and lead
to depression, cognitive impairment, and premature Alzheimer’s
disease, Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis.31
Tragic Toll, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/24/
high-school-football-deaths-2015.
25 Les Carpenter, Kenney Bui: The Life and Death of a High School Football Player,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/oct/14/
kenney-bui-high-school-football (explaining that in Bui’s case, his parents attempted to
prevent him from playing football, particularly as he was cleared 13 days after a first
concussion in the same season that he died).
26 Dana Ford & Ray Sanchez, High School Football Player Andre Smith Dies in Illinois,
CNN (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/25/us/illinois-highschool-football-player-death.
27 Kahler & Greene, supra note 24; see also Cam Smith, Parents of Kansas Teen Luke
Schemm Believe Death Was a ‘Fluke Accident’, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://usatodayhss.com/2015/parents-of-late-kansas-teen-luke-schemm-believe-deathwas-a-fluke-accident.
28 See Diane Herbst, Experts Alarmed Over 13 High School Football Deaths This
Season, PEOPLE (Dec. 3, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://people.com/sports/experts-alarmedover-13-high-school-football-deaths-this-season/ (explaining that heat stroke, spinal
injury, and brain injury were the primary causes of death).
29 Lara DePadilla et al., Self-Reported Concussions from Playing a Sport or Being
Physically Active Among High School Students - United States, 2017, 67 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 682 (2018).
30 Kristen L. Kucera et al., Traumatic Brain and Spinal Cord Fatalities Among High
School and College Football Players - United States, 2005–2014, 65 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1465 (2017).
31 See infra Part II.B.
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Concussion in professional sports has attracted substantial attention
in the past decade. At the professional level, football, ice hockey, and
soccer have been the targets of both legal actions and saturated media
coverage of head injury and team and league responses to it. In 2017,
the National Football League (“NFL”) reported 281 concussions, an alltime high.32 The interest in concussion in professional football is
particularly intense. In September 2014, the NFL acknowledged, in
documents intended to help them to calculate liability payments, that
approximately one-third of retired football players will develop
dementia, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(“ALS”), or similarly debilitating cognitive disorders, at premature
ages.33 Defendants in lawsuits aren’t known to overestimate their
exposure during settlement negotiations, so if there’s any controversy
in this estimate, it would be whether it is high enough, not too high. A
study in 2017 reported head pain or migraine symptoms consistent with
post-concussion sequelae in fully 92% of retired football players.34 This
stark prognosis for NFL players increases the heat of the question, “how
much is too much?”, or as a cover of Time Magazine put it, “Is Football
Worth It?”.35
Yet Americans love football. For now, the fundamental safety
threshold for professional football is balanced on the other side by the
more than 18 million viewers who tune in to watch Sunday night
football each weekend.36 Football is the most popular sport to watch in
the United States, and despite a modest drop in the past year, it remains
near the height of its popularity.37 The conversation around concussion
in football incorporates this glaring contradiction: the sport is at once
beloved by the public and devastating to the players and to their

32 Kevin Seifert, NFL Concussions Continue to Rise, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22226487/nfl-concussions-rise-highest-level-leaguebegan-sharing-data.
33 Ken Belson, Brain Trauma to Affect One in Three Players, N.F.L. Agrees, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/sports/football/actuarial-reportsin-nfl-concussion-deal-are-released.html.
34 Randolph W. Evans, The Prevalence of Migraine and Other Neurological Conditions
Among Retired National Football League Players: A Pilot Study, PRACTICAL NEUROLOGY,
Nov./Dec. 2017, at 23.
35 Sean Gregory, The Tragic Risks of American Football, TIME (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://time.com/magazine/us/3397061/september-29th-2014-vol-184-no-12-u-s/.
36 Rani Molla, ‘Sunday Night Football’ was the Highest-Rated TV Show This Year, but
its Audience Is Smaller Than Last Year, RECODE (Dec. 18, 2017, 1:11 PM):
https://www.recode.net/2017/12/18/16791198/sunday-night-football-tv-nielsen-2017most-watched.
37 Id.
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families. Without the intense love of football from the fans, it is difficult
to imagine the tolerance of this amount of acceptable destruction to the
brains of the players. As a thought experiment, imagine a new game
were invented, in which players ran through obstacle courses, and onethird would break their backs or hit their heads in a way that caused
permanent brain damage. It likely would fail from the start, no matter
how entertaining. Like tobacco, football is a special case, and the love
of football is the regulatory complication. Understanding the cultural
force of adult football is essential to understanding the state of traumatic
brain injury prevention protocols in both youth football and in the array
of other youth sports struggling with the problem in the shadow of
football. The way we resolve the adult risk landscape may not entirely
control the youth risk landscape, but I would argue that it’s impossible
to ignore the significant influence of the adult resolution on the youth
landscape.
Football has always been dangerous. Forty-five football players died
between 1900 and 1905, when Teddy Roosevelt convened Ivy League
leaders at the White House to save football by “reducing the element of
brutality in play,” leading to a series of reforms such as forward passing
of the ball, which spread players out and reduced contact.38 Even with
these reforms, in the year 1931, “football killed 40 boys and young
men.”39 Danger has been as much a feature as a bug in the history of the
football. But the contours of that danger are gaining greater clarity from
a mix of substantially improved medical research, lawsuits, and media
coverage. Knowing something is generally dangerous is different from
understanding exactly which dangers are present, the specific and longterm consequences of those dangers, and participants’ likelihood of
suffering those consequences.
Meaningful consent requires information; this is the premise of fairly
allocating risk calculations to individual participants. While many
research questions remain, there is substantially more information
about these dangers than there was a decade ago. Some in the football
industry, like legendary broadcaster Bob Costas, have repeatedly
questioned whether football can survive our improved medical
understanding, and are working to improve sports broadcast coverage
to reduce the amount of placating euphemism and to replace it with

38 Katie Zezima, How Teddy Roosevelt Helped Save Football, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014,
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/teddy-roosevelthelped-save-football-with-a-white-house-meeting-in-1905/.
39 Medicine: Varsatility, TIME (Dec. 14, 1931), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,930056,00.html.
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more accurate and sober language and information.40 Costas has
basically left football, concluding that the game “destroys people’s
brains.”41
In the United States today, 1.1 million high school students play
football at school.42 Another 3 million youth play non-school, organized
contact football using full protective gear, such as middle and
elementary school Pop Warner play.43 By contrast, only 100,000 play in
collegiate or professional or semi-professional post-high school
settings.44 Framing the discussion around the relatively small number
of adult players has the capacity to influence a far larger group of players
whose risks of concussion are higher and whose capacity to consent is
lower. We are spending a great deal of cultural energy contemplating
the destruction/entertainment/consent conundrum in professional
sports, without enough attention to the interplay between professional
sports and youth concussion risk.45
II.

THE PROBLEM OF TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY (CONCUSSIONS)

The symptoms of a concussion can be challenging to observe and to
distinguish from psychological or emotional states like fatigue and heat

40 Jacob Feldman, Bob Costas Supports CLF Initiative to Educate Media Members on
Concussions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.si.com/techmedia/2018/11/09/bob-costas-concussion-legacy-foundation-education; see also John
Branch, ESPN Football Analyst Walks Away, Disturbed By Brain Trauma On Field, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/sports/espn-edcunningham-football-concussions.html (narrating that Ed Cunningham, a prominent
ESPN commentator, has also walked away from a promising football media career over
the issue).
41 Feldman, supra note 40.
42 AJ Willingham, Deaths on College and High School Football Fields Are a Rare – But
Reliable – Tragedy, CNN (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
09/21/health/football-deaths-season-injuries-high-school-college-trnd/index.html.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 An egregious example of the interplay came in a 2012 Public Service
Announcement (“PSA”) starring New England’s beloved Tom Brady, in which he
directly encourages parents to trust the safety of the game. A joke is embedded in the
PSA: the worried parent who Brady reassures is revealed in the end not to be her minor
child, as you’ve assumed, but her adult professional player, Baltimore Ravens’ Ray
Lewis, thereby directly flattening out the distinction between handling NFL risk and
handling youth risk. BillR2009, Newest NFL Evolution commercial.mp4, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3iE6Jnh8jU (providing a PSA as
part of the NFL “Play Smart, Play Safe” campaign); see TEDxYouth, Head Games: Duncan
Jurayj and Kate Silbaugh at TEDxYouth@BeaconStreet, YOUTUBE (Dec. 28, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcoHs6m25UQ.
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illness.46 There is no physiological screen for a brain injury, much less
a rapid screen that can be administered on the sidelines. Headache,
difficulty focusing, sluggishness, moodiness, fatigue, and nausea are
common in concussed athletes. But these symptoms are common in
youth without a concussion as well. The athlete herself becomes the
crucial source of information about her condition, yet she may not be
in a state to accurately pinpoint and describe symptoms due to the
concussion itself, the general limits of her young age, her desire to
conceal or minimize her symptoms to speed her return to play, or in
response to the vagueness of the experience of being concussed.
Researchers have understood for some time that children are more
vulnerable to concussion than adults in three ways. Children and
teenagers are more likely to be concussed by an impact, more likely to
suffer serious long-term consequences from a concussion, and take
longer to recover from a concussion than adults.47 All three differences
between youth and adult concussion point toward a higher need to
protect the under-aged brain independent of differences in the maturity
needed to assess the risk decision.
A. Finding Concussion Rates in Youth Sports
Researchers do not agree on the incident rate of concussions in youth
sports. In the past, concussions were graded by presumed severity based
on whether a concussed person lost consciousness (and for how long),
or exhibited amnesia (and for how long). The use of that grading system
has diminished with evidence that it did not predict the longevity and
intensity of concussion symptoms: relatively mild initial symptoms
could intensify and be prolonged, while relatively intense immediate
symptoms could abate quickly.48
Sports are not the primary cause of serious traumatic brain injury;
falls and car accidents, for example, cause more traumatic brain injury

46 Keith A. Scorza et al., Current Concepts in Concussion: Evaluation and Management,
85 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 123, 124 (2012).
47 See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, A FACT SHEET FOR YOUTH SPORTS
PARENTS (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/youthsports/parents_eng.pdf.
48 See Christopher C. Giza et al., Summary of Evidence-Based Guideline Update:
Evaluation and Management of Concussion in Sports: Report of the Guideline Development
Subcommittee of The American Academy of Neurology, 80 AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY 2250,
2252-53 (2013); Gary Mihoces, Group Issues Updated Concussion Guidelines, USA TODAY
(Mar. 18, 2013, 8:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/18/
sports-possible-concussions/1997797/.
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than sports.49 Nevertheless, the incidence of sports-related concussion
is routinely underreported due to an obvious error of classification in
early foundational study of the subject that only included patients who
had lost consciousness due to their concussions.50 In addition, some
public health work has suggested that among athletes more than 50%
of concussions go unreported.51 According to the CDC, during each of
the years between 2001 and 2010, more than 2.5 million people were
either hospitalized or went to the emergency room with a traumatic
brain injury.52 Since many concussions do not come through hospitals,
the number of annual concussions is not known definitively.53 The problem
of ascertaining the number has been clearly surfaced in the literature.
One meta-survey of over 100 studies concluded that:
[i]n 2013, the researchers calculated an incidence rate of
between 14 and 24 sports- and recreation-related concussions
per 1,000 children.54

49 Julie Winstanley et al., Early Indicators and Contributors to Psychological Distress
in Relatives During Rehabilitation Following Severe Traumatic Brain Injury: Findings from
the Brain Injury Outcomes Study, 21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 453, 458 (2006).
50 That study found 300,000 recreation and sports-related concussions annually,
and it has long informed thinking about concussion in recreational sports. But another
study indicates that as few as 8% of concussed individuals lose consciousness. Mark R.
Schulz et al., Incidence and Risk Factors for Concussion in High School Athletes, North
Carolina, 1996–1999, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 937, 940 (2004). If it’s appropriate to
extrapolate from those two CDC numbers, this would mean between 1.6 million and
3.8 million concussions each year due to sports and recreational activities alone,
combining adults and youth. Scorza et al., supra note 46.
51 Zachary Y. Kerr et al., Disclosure and Non-Disclosure of Concussion and Concussion
Symptoms in Athletes: Review and Application of the Socio-Ecological Framework, 28 BRAIN
INJ. 1009, 1011-14 (2014); Timothy B. Meier et al., The Underreporting of Self-Reported
Symptoms Following Sports-Related Concussion, 18 J. SCI. & MED. SPORT 507, 510 (2014)
(pointing out that athletes underreport post-concussive symptoms to team medical
staff).
52 Rates of TBI-Related Emergency Department Visits, Hospitalizations, and Deaths —
United States, 2001–2010, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
traumaticbraininjury/data/rates.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
53 The prior method of counting concussions reflected the prior medical
understanding that a concussion that involved the loss of consciousness or an
emergency room visit defined the injury. The medical community has more recently
concluded that the correlation between the immediate result of a hit and the long term
sequela is weaker than previously believed and seen the need for a different metric to
establish the prevalence of concussion overall, and youth athletic concussion in
particular.
54 Carly Rasmussen et al., How Dangerous Are Youth Sports for the Brain? A Review
of the Evidence, 7 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 67, 91 (2018).
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This thorough survey of the existing literature is bounded by its sources,
most of which continue to rely on emergency room visits.55
Since that survey was completed, a new source of information has
indicated a higher rate of high school concussion than previously
understood, fully ten times higher than the meta-survey described
above. In 2017, the CDC added a question about concussion for the first
time to its highly valued Youth Risk Behavior Survey (“YRBS”). The
CDC administers this survey every other year to a large cross-section of
high school students. The anonymous survey had a sample size in 2017
of 14,765, and an 81% response rate among the students randomly
selected to participate. Among high school students alone, the selfreports indicate 2.5 million students experienced a concussion from
sports or similar activities in 2017.56 In addition, the survey question
asked whether students had experienced a concussion “from playing a
sport or being physically active?” This framing of the question
eliminates another source of noise in the prior data introduced by car
accidents or falls, which are the number one cause of traumatic brain
injury. In other words, asking teenagers whether they’d experienced a
concussion from playing sports or being physically active, and not
requiring an emergency room visit, caused the number of concussions
reported to skyrocket.
When the new CDC figures are expressed in percentages, a full 15.1%
of high school students had experienced a sports- or activity-related
concussion in the past twelve months alone. Among students who
played on two sports teams in the past twelve months, 22.9% had
experienced a sports- or activity-related concussion during that period.
For those who played on three sports teams during that period, the
figure is 30.3%. As a rough estimate of the risks associated with youth
athletics, these figures become concerning because of the improved
understanding of the potential long-term consequences for these
children. In addition, there is wide variation in prevalence by sport, and
while some of that variation is obvious (football and ice hockey are

55 See id. at 122-91. Nevertheless, this work advances our sport-specific estimates
of risk greatly. For estimates of unreported concussions and those that do not include
emergency room visits, this survey extrapolated from two surveys that attempted to
measure unreported concussions, one focused on female middle school soccer players
and the other on a sample of 1,500 high school football players in Wisconsin. Id. at 91
n.103. Nonetheless, the incidence this survey produces is slightly lower than many
other surveys, confusing a number of working hypotheses.
56 DePadilla et al., supra note 29.
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higher frequency), some is less obvious in the absence of good
information campaigns (e.g., girls’ soccer is high frequency).57
B. Consequences of Traumatic Brain Injury (Concussion)
The medical understanding of concussion outcomes has evolved
dramatically in recent years. According to the CDC, traumatic brain
injury can lead to temporary or long-term functional deficits to
cognitive, physical, and emotional health. These changes can be to
thinking (including memory and reasoning); sensation (including sight
and balance); language (including communication, expression, and
understanding); and emotion (including, depression, anxiety,
personality changes, aggression, acting out, and social
inappropriateness).58 In addition to these functional changes,
concussion can cause epilepsy and it appears to increase the risk of
brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease.59
An adolescent concussion increases the risk of developing multiple
sclerosis as an adult.60 The evidence of these links has become stronger
in recent years, though the long-term consequences are not yet
expressed in the format that would be relevant to a parent: What’s the
likelihood that my child will suffer these long-term consequences if she
suffers a concussion?
There were significant battles between researchers and the NFL over
the development of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”)
studies, both by Dr. Omalu and by the Boston University CTE Center;
these have been chronicled at length elsewhere.61 When
neuropathologist Ann McKee dissected 111 brains of former NFL
players donated to Boston University’s brain bank, she found that 110
of 111 had CTE.62 The sample of 111 brains is skewed because those
suffering neurodegenerative symptoms are most likely to donate their
57

See Rasmussen et al., supra note 54, at 92.
Hodge & Hubbard, supra note 3, at 31; Potential Effects, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/outcomes.html [hereinafter
Potential Effects] (last reviewed Feb. 25, 2019).
59 Sources cited supra note 58; INST. MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SPORTSRELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH 222 (2014).
60 Scott Montgomery et al., Concussion in Adolescence and Risk of Multiple Sclerosis,
82 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 554, 556-57 (2017).
61 See, e.g., MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL,
CONCUSSIONS, AND THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH (2013); JEANNE M. LASKAS, CONCUSSION
(2015).
62 Joe Ward et al., 110 N.F.L. Brains, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/sports/football/nfl-cte.html.
58
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brains to the bank, but even so, the finding is remarkable. For the first
time, a physiological correlate to the symptoms of post-concussive
neurodegenerative phenomena could be seen across an enormous
sample, and to a near-perfect prevalence. CTE is not the only measure
of harm from traumatic brain injury, but it is demonstrated with
pathology evidence among a population with a clear history of head
trauma, and so it anchors one end of the concussion inquiry. A 2017
study found that 92% of retired NFL players suffered head pain or
migraine.63 In addition, the NFL’s long-term effort to bury information
about the dangers of head trauma leave a culture of distrust in the
information ecology around concussion risk for the population as a
whole.64 Once the public learns that an intentional effort to conceal risk
has been undertaken by a powerful entity, it is difficult to know when
the disinformation has ended and it is safe to trust the updates.
Against the backdrop of this skepticism, the concrete evidence
surrounding youth and concussion outcomes is a combination of
concerning and incomplete. But the evidence points toward the
conclusion that youth concussion is more dangerous than adult concussion
along every relevant measure.
Youth are more likely to sustain concussions than adults.65 Youth are
also slower to recover from concussion than adults; they are more likely
to be in the prolonged recovery group.66 Symptoms tend to be more
acute and to last longer in minors.67 While concussion symptoms abate
for most people within a week, they last longer for approximately 10%
of people, and among that prolonged recovery group, symptoms are still

63

Evans, supra note 34.
See Matt Vasilogambros, The NFL’s Concussion Cover-Up, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/05/nfls-concussion-cover-up/
484016/.
65 Annie Baillargeon et al., Neuropsychological and Neurophysiological Assessment of
Sport Concussion in Children, Adolescents and Adults, 26 BRAIN INJ. 211, 212 (2012); RACHEL
RAMSDEN ET AL., B.C. INJ. RES. & PREVENTION UNIT, CONCUSSION AMONG CHILDREN AND
YOUTH IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, at ii (2016), http://www.injuryresearch.bc.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Concussion-in-Interior-Health-Jan_27_2016-FINAL.pdf; see Tracey
Covassin et al., The Role of Age and Sex in Symptoms, Neurocognitive Performance, and
Postural Stability in Athletes After Concussion, 40 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1303, 1304, 1310
(2012) (discussing the increased severity of concussion symptoms in high school versus
collegiate athletes).
66 Grant L. Iverson et al., Predictors of Clinical Recovery from Concussion: A
Systematic Review, 51 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 941, 942 (2017).
67 Paul McCrory et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the 2nd International
Conference on Concussion in Sport, Prague 2004, 39 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 196, 197 (2005);
see also Baillargeon et al., supra note 65, at 212.
64
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reported up to 45-90 days post-concussion.68 Loss of consciousness
correlates with prolonged recovery, but the correlation is not as strong
as was once believed.69 Youth who have already experienced and
recovered from one concussion are more likely to experience prolonged
symptoms if they experience a second concussion.70
The CDC explains that repeated concussions can lead to cumulative
deficits, while repeated concussions close together in time can be fatal:
Repeated mild TBIs occurring over an extended period of time
can result in cumulative neurological and cognitive deficits.
Repeated mild TBIs occurring within a short period of time (i.e.,
hours, days, or weeks) can be catastrophic or fatal.71
Two concussions occurring close together in time can lead to a
phenomenon sometimes referred to as second-impact syndrome, which
can lead to fatal swelling in the brain.72 This phenomenon is likely
implicated in most or all of the deaths of the high school football players
described earlier. The risk that this will occur is low, but the
consequence is dire. In addition, the fatality can be surprising relative
to the hit. While parents may know that their child can die from a
catastrophic traumatic brain injury in an automobile accident, they do
not appreciate that two moderate, or even mild, blows to the head
within the same game or practice could carry that extraordinary
consequence. In addition, second-impact syndrome is avoidable if
athletes are removed from play after experiencing the first concussion.73
Second-impact syndrome is a good target for an information campaign
68 Michael McCrea et al., Incidence, Clinical Course, and Predictors of Prolonged
Recovery Time Following Sport-Related Concussion in High School and College Athletes, 19
J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 22, 30 (2013).
69 Annette Sterr et al., Are Mild Head Injuries as Mild as We Think? Neurobehavioral
Concomitants of Chronic Post-Concussion Syndrome, BMC NEUROLOGY, at 5-6 (2006).
70 Lianne Castile et al., The Epidemiology of New Versus Recurrent Sports Concussions
Among High School Athletes, 2005–2010, 46 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 603, 606-07 (2011);
Matthew A. Eisenberg et al., Time Interval Between Concussions and Symptom Duration,
132 PEDIATRICS 8, 11 (2013).
71 Potential Effects, supra note 58.
72 See id.; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 70; Teisaburo Mori et al., Acute
Hemispheric Swelling Associated With Thin Subdural Hematomas: Pathophysiology of
Repetitive Head Injury in Sports, 96 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA 40, 41 (2006); David Xavier
Cifu et al., Repetitive Head Injury Syndrome: Background, Epidemiology, Functional
Anatomy, MEDSCAPE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/92189overview.
73 See Responding to a Concussion and Action Plan for Coaches, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/basics/concussion_respondingto.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019).

2019]

The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk

217

both because the phenomenon is not obvious and because information
can lead to actions that avoid the harm. At the same time, it is only one
of the risks of concussion, and not the most prevalent of either the
short- or the long-term consequences risked when exposed to traumatic
brain injury.74
The unanswered question is this: How many apparently mild
concussions will have long-term consequences?75 Some evidence from
soccer suggests that cognitive harm can result from multiple subconcussive hits, including from heading the ball.76 But what is the rate
of long-term consequences? There is evidence that one-quarter of youth
concussions include some amnesia.77 One study found that those who
experience amnesia are more likely to suffer memory and attention
issues two decades later.78 The strength of the association between
prolonged recovery and long-term consequences is unclear. Evidence
suggests that approximately 15% of those experiencing concussion
“suffer from deficits one year after injury.”79 One study compared a
group of adult athletes who had suffered their last concussion thirty
years ago to a control group of adult athletes who had no history of
concussion. Those with no concussion history had superior cognitive
functioning across a variety of tasks, compared to those who had a
concussion 30 years ago.80 It appears that the plasticity of the youth
brain makes it more vulnerable to long-term cognitive impairment.81

74 Charles H. Tator, Concussions and Their Consequences: Current Diagnosis,
Management, and Prevention, 185 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 975, 975 (2013); Potential Effects,
supra note 58.
75 Giza et al., supra note 48, at 2252 (“No studies were found relevant to prediction
of sports-related neurologic catastrophe or chronic neurobehavioral impairment.”).
76 Walter F. Stewart et al., Heading Frequency Is More Strongly Related to Cognitive
Performance Than Unintentional Head Impacts in Amateur Soccer Players, 9 FRONTIERS
NEUROLOGY 1, 5, 7 (2018); Gretchen Reynolds, Heading the Soccer Ball May Be Bad for
Young Brains, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/
well/heading-soccer-ball-children-kids-concussion-brain.html.
77 William P. Meehan III et al., High School Concussions in the 2008-2009 Academic
Year: Mechanism, Symptoms, and Management, 38 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 2405, 2406-07
(2010).
78 Erik Hessen et al., Neuropsychological Function in a Group of Patients 25 Years
After Sustaining Minor Head Injuries as Children and Adolescents, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J.
PSYCHOL. 245, 248 (2006).
79 DANIEL H. DANESHVAR ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES:
EFFECTS ON NORMAL DEVELOPMENT PROFILE AFTER CONCUSSION 3 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3208826/pdf/nihms-316875.pdf.
80 Louis De Beaumont et al., Brain Function Decline in Healthy Retired Athletes Who
Sustained Their Last Sports Concussion in Early Adulthood, 132 BRAIN 695, 704 (2009).
81 Pullela et al., supra note 14, at 407.
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These findings do not present a clear overall risk magnitude, but neither
are they reassuring. They indicate that some significant proportion of
youth athletes — 15%? more? less? — will experience a concussion
each year, 10–15% of those will have a prolonged recovery, and either
group runs a heightened risk of cognitive deficits in the present and of
neurodegenerative disease decades later. When the incomplete state of
the research was combined with the revelation that concussion risk had
been minimized and concealed by professional athletic leagues,
pressure built to intervene on behalf of youth athletes.
Taken together, all of the new information about youth risk led to
pressure on state legislatures to take action to protect children from
traumatic brain injury. From this pressure, catalyzed by one concussion
victim in Washington State, the Lystedt structure emerged.
III. LYSTEDT LAWS
In 2009, Washington State became the first to pass a concussion
return to play law, commonly called the Lystedt law. By 2015, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia had followed suit,82 a remarkably
quick legislative timetable for change.83 As a number of commentators
have observed, the rapid pace of legislative adoption did not allow for
time to research the efficacy of the Lystedt model, yet the model became
the blueprint for nationwide standards.84 Indeed, in 2010, NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell wrote a letter to governors urging them
to pass legislation modeled on the Lystedt elements.85 With the NFL
backing and the urgency of the issue increasing in the public dialogue,
the Lystedt model became the default nationwide, even though its
efficacy had not been tested and its underlying theory not subject to
thorough critical evaluation.
A. Lystedt’s Return to Play Framework
Lystedt laws are not aimed at preventing mild or moderate long-term
consequences of concussion. Instead, they are aimed almost exclusively
82 Traumatic Brain Injury Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURE (Oct.
11, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/traumatic-brain-injury-legislation.aspx.
83 See id. (providing most up to date status of state legislation and tracking
legislative activity and provides access to statutory language by state).
84 Lowrey & Morain, supra note 3, at 298; see also Hosea H. Harvey, Reducing
Traumatic Brain Injuries in Youth Sports: Youth Sports Traumatic Brain Injury State Laws,
January 2009–December 2012, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1249, 1250 (2013).
85 Goodell Sends Letter to 44 Governors, ESPN (May 23, 2010), http://www.espn.
com/nfl/news/story?id=5212326 [hereafter Goodell Sends Letter].
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at preventing concussed youth players from returning to play and
thereby finding themselves at risk for catastrophic second-impact
syndrome. To accomplish this goal, the laws generally consist of three
components. First, the strongest laws usually call for the education or
training of coaches, athletes, and parents, so that they will recognize the
signs of a concussion. Second, the laws generally contain a requirement
that an athlete showing signs of concussion must be removed from play
for evaluation. Finally, the laws usually include a requirement that such
athletes may not return to play until a designated health care provider,
ranging from a physician to a school trainer, depending on the state,
clears the student for play.86 These laws aim to reduce the number of
youth players who experience life-threatening second hits after they
have already been concussed. To reduce that risk, coaches, players, and
parents need the skill to recognize that a concussion may have occurred,
and they need to know what to do: remove the child from play and do
not allow her to return until she is healed in the view of a designated
expert.
1.

Information for Whom?

The educational components of the laws vary from state to state. In
general, though, these laws require coaches, parents, and/or student
athletes to receive information about concussion, ordinarily through
dissemination of printed information. Half of the states do not require
coaches to receive any training for how to deal with an apparently
concussed athlete, ostensibly the heart of second-impact prevention.87
Only twenty-nine states require coaches to even receive passive
information about concussion risk, short of training. Only seven states
require referees to receive concussion training, though they would seem
to be essential to a legislative scheme designed to respond effectively to
second-impact risk.88 Only forty-four states require the athlete
themselves to receive even passive information. Yet forty-nine states
require parents to receive concussion information. Parents are the most
consistent target of the information across the state statutory schemes.
They are the organizing feature of that information campaign.

86 NAT’L CTR. INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, IMPLEMENTING RETURN TO PLAY 8-9,
https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/policy/rtp_implementation-a.pdf (last visited July
24, 2019).
87 Lau, supra note 3, at 2889-91.
88 Kim et al., supra note 3, at 174.
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Efficacy

There has been little study of the efficacy of the legislation,89 and what
there is shows mixed results. On the one hand, coaches in particular
appear to be better educated on the risk and harms of concussion than
they were prior to enactment of the laws, while athletes show less
improvement.90 A recent survey of the research on the efficacy of
Lystedt describes the study design of each evaluation, and remarkably,
parents have not been surveyed or studied. The efficacy studies have
focused instead on the impressions of health care providers, coaches,
athletes, and others in the league and school orbits.91 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, coaches and schools identify parents as an impediment
to effective enforcement of the legislation.92 We can only speculate
about whether parents would say the same of them, because it appears
no study has considered them a key data source when evaluating the
efficacy of the legislation. This is a noteworthy oversight given that
parents are the consensus target of information across state variation for
other constituencies.
The Lystedt laws contain a return to play protocol, and in forty-seven
states, a healthcare provider needs to decide that an athlete is cleared
for play. Only twenty-five states require such healthcare providers to be
trained in concussion, either by virtue of their profession or through a
specific training.93
3.

Post-concussion Focus

Parent information provided under the Lystedt statutes is generally
limited to post-concussion related information: What are the signs of a
concussion, and what are the return to play protocols? If risk
information is conveyed, it tends to be about returning to play, not
about the underlying primary concussion risk in that sport or in youth
sports in general.94 Indeed, the CDC parent information sheet, which is
89 See Kathryn Coxe et al., Consistency and Variation in School-Level Youth Sports
Traumatic Brain Injury Policy Content, 62 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 255, 256 (2017); Shen,
supra note 3, at 8. But see Lowrey & Morain, supra note 3, at 290-91.
90 Chrisman, supra note 3, at 1192-93.
91 See Shen, supra note 3.
92 Id. at 19 (stating that the author is conducting a survey that has not yet been
published that includes parents).
93 Kim et al., supra note 3, at 175.
94 See, e.g., CITY OF KIRKLAND PARKS & CMTY. SERVS. DEP’T YOUTH SPORTS, ZACKERY
LYSTEDT LAW – CONCUSSION / HEAD INJURY AND SUDDEN CARDIAC ARREST POLICIES (2014),
https://www.kirklandwa.gov/Assets/Parks/Parks+PDFs/Parks_Features/Lystedt+Law+
Agreement.pdf.
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designed to assist states in putting together information to comply with
these statutes, contains information only about recognizing a
concussion, seeking medical treatment, and following return to play
protocols, but no information about the background risk of primary
concussion or its potential long-term consequences.95 The information
provided does not invite parents to make an overall pre-participation
risk assessment using appropriate information to that task. To make
that assessment, parents would need to learn about their child’s overall
risk of concussion and the long-term consequences of concussion.96
4.

Immunity from Tort Liability

While these laws place a burden on school districts and coaches,
twenty-four of them offer in exchange complete immunity from lawsuit
to actors within the system, such as coaches, schools, trainers, or
physicians, who properly followed the specific return to play protocols
set out in the statute.97 This immunity is a powerful rollback of the
underlying tort law in the area, which would ordinarily hold school
districts and coaches responsible for the exercise of due care in running
athletic programs, not just in the narrow return to play protocols
covered by the Lystedt framework.
B. Deficiencies in the Lystedt Law
Many scholars have criticized aspects of the Lystedt laws, particularly
in states that enacted weaker versions.98

95 CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PARENT & ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INFORMATION SHEET, https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/custom/headsupconcussion_
parent_athlete_info.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (inviting coaches and schools to
customize the handouts with their team logo); see also CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, A FACT SHEET FOR PARENTS, https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/
schools/tbi_factsheets_parents-508-a.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
96 See Rasmussen et al., supra note 54, at 71 (arguing that this primary risk
information should be assessed and provided prior to participation to improve risk
decision-making).
97 See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(i) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.539(G)(2) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 118.293(5)(a) (2013); see also, Kim et al., supra
note 3 (pointing out that twenty-four states provide immunity to those that comply with
the statute’s return to play protocols).
98 Spaude, supra note 3, at 1113-14.
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Minimal Coverage, Thin Operations

While state law varies widely on the way each of these elements are
handled, several general aspects of these laws have come under scrutiny.
For example, many laws don’t cover enough athletes, as many are
limited to public high school athletes only and fail to address private
school, middle school, or youth league athletes. In addition, many laws
don’t require sufficient baseline cognitive testing that would allow for
more accurate post-hit concussion diagnosis. Some would like to see
laws that require sideline health care providers, despite the difficulty of
providing them in rural areas in particular. Some of the laws allow
return to play sign-off from medical care para-professionals who may
not have adequate concussion knowledge.99 In addition, most laws don’t
adequately address issues concussed students have in returning to the
classroom, as distinct from the playing field. Moreover, the laws treat a
“cleared” player as completely cured, rather than tightening removal or
return to play protocols for players who have suffered one or more prior
concussions, and are therefore at an even higher risk of second-impact
syndrome and of prolonged recovery periods. The legal literature has
also raised questions about the adequacy of the information given to
coaches, athletes, and parents, and about the ability of a concussed
athlete to make a meaningful decision in a state of cognitive
impairment.100
2.

No Primary Prevention

While each of these critiques is significant, by far the most significant
failure of the Lystedt legislative structure is that it does nothing to
minimize the risks of suffering a first concussion, as it contains no
primary prevention strategy. Given the enormous infrastructure of
parental, coach, and athlete information generated by these laws across
fifty states, it seems a glaring omission to skip straight to the second
concussion and entirely ignore health, awareness, and prevention of the
first. But that’s precisely what the Lystedt framework does. It structures
a landscape where first concussions are inevitable and are day one of
the risk, such that a child’s first concussion initiates the call to action,
rather than the child’s participation in contact sports. Lystedt contains
no primary prevention incentives. Arguably, by focusing on post-

99 See William P. Meehan III, Assessment and Management of Sport-Related
Concussions in United States High Schools, 39 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 2304, 2308 (2011).
100 See generally sources cited supra note 3.
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concussion protocols, Lystedt draws the attention of athletes and
parents away from the question of primary prevention.
The CDC describes the appropriate response to sports concussion
risk as follows:
To minimize TBI in sports and recreation activities, primary and
secondary prevention strategies should be implemented.
Primary prevention strategies include: 1) using protective
equipment (e.g., a bicycle helmet) that is appropriate for the
activity or position, fits correctly, is well maintained, and is used
consistently and correctly; 2) coaching appropriate sport-specific
skills with an emphasis on safe practices and proper technique; 3)
adhering to rules of play with good sportsmanship and strict
officiating; and 4) attention to strength and conditioning.
Secondary prevention strategies include increasing awareness of
the signs and symptoms of TBI and recognizing and responding
quickly and appropriately to suspected TBI.101
These are clear medical recommendations to focus on primary
prevention strategies as well as to improve return to play protocols.102
Yet Lystedt legislation fails to capture or address any of the thorny
questions around the optimal design and usage practices of protective
equipment,103 the crucial role of officiating in preventing concussion,104
and whether required strength training could play a preventive role in
concussion.105 These CDC-recommended practices pose very little
101 Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries Related to Sports and Recreation Activities Among
Persons Aged ≤ 19 Years — United States, 2001-2009, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1337 (2011) (emphasis added).
102 L. Syd M. Johnson, Return to Play Guidelines Cannot Solve the Football Related
Concussion Problem, 82 J. SCH. HEALTH 180, 180-85 (2012).
103 Jason Navia, Note, Sitting on the Bench: The Failure of Youth Football Helmet
Regulation and the Necessity of Government Intervention, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 268
(2012).
104 R. Dawn Comstock et al., An Evidence-Based Discussion of Heading the Ball And
Concussions In High School Soccer, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 830, 836 (2015); Ken Belson,
A 5-Concussion Pee Wee Game Leads to Penalties for the Adults, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/sports/football/pee-wee-football-gamewith-concussions-brings-penalties-for-adults.html.
105 James T. Eckner et al., Effect of Neck Muscle Strength and Anticipatory Cervical
Muscle Activation on the Kinematic Response of the Head to Impulsive Loads, 42 AM. J.
SPORTS MED. 566, 566-76 (2014). See generally Abrams supra note 3, at 12-13
(discussing state and local power to curb youth concussion injuries); Douglas E.
Abrams, Confronting the Youth Sports Concussions Crisis: A Central Role for Responsible
Local Enforcement of Playing Rules, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 75, 88-89 (2013)
(modifications to rules of play are only effective when properly enforced); Douglas E.

224

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:197

harm to sports as currently conceived, and have the potential to prevent
that first concussion. Yet Lystedt legislation across the country, passed
to protect youth athletes from the negative effects of concussion, gives
no attention to these potential interventions, and develops no
framework for ensuring that they are considered.
3.

Tackling Changes to the Practices and Rules of the Game

Given that even these relatively minor interventions are not
incentivized or required by Lystedt, it should be no surprise that
nothing in the Lystedt structure nudges athletic leagues or schools
toward the more difficult problem of adjusting rules of play. Some
organizations up and down the age scale are slowly moving in this
direction on their own. For example, the NFL has eliminated two-a-day
padded practices,106 and the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) recently followed suit.107 The Ivy League recently eliminated
all full-contact hitting practices.108 Some youth leagues are also
experimenting with adjustments, such as postponing heading of the ball
in soccer until age ten and limiting it until age fourteen, and postponing
checking in hockey. Leagues are reducing the type and amount of
contact in practices in Pop Warner football,109 and experimenting with
rule changes to games, such as eliminating special teams and requiring
players to match up against similarly sized opponents.110 The NFL
recently moved the kickoff line from the thirty to the thirty-five yard
line, and ESPN has reported that the NFL is considering eliminating the

Abrams, Player Safety in Youth Sports: Sportsmanship and Respect as an Injury-Prevention
Strategy, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 12-13 (2012) (achieving the protective
purpose of playing rules depends on parents, coaches, officials, and league
administrators who can enforce standards of sportsmanship and respect).
106 D. Orlando Ledbetter, Look at NFL’s New Practice Rules, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(July 31, 2011), https://www.ajc.com/sports/football/look-nfl-new-practice-rules/
ZLKiNsjADuSDy8uHzsvYoN/.
107 Richard Johnson, NCAA Bans 2-a-Day Football Practices, and it Was a Long Time
Coming, SB NATION (Apr. 14, 2017, 2:50 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/collegefootball/2017/4/14/15304464/ncaa-bans-2-a-day-practices.
108 Ken Belson, Ivy League Moves to Eliminate Tackling at Football Practices, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/sports/ncaafootball/ivyleague-moves-to-eliminate-tackling-at-practices.html.
109 Tom Farrey, Pop Warner to Limit Practice Contact, ESPN (June 15, 2012),
http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/8046203/pop-warner-toughens-safety-measureslimiting-contact-practice.
110 Javonte Anderson, Youth Football Changes Set to Head Off Concussion Rate, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/posttribune/news/ct-ptb-state-of-football-st-0202-20170203-story.html.
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kickoff entirely because the play produces so many injuries.111 The Ivy
League moved the kickoff line from the 35-yard line to the 40-yard line,
and concussions fell from 11 per 1,000 kicks to 2 per 1,000 kicks.112
Leagues weigh rule changes at their own pace, but nothing in the
Lystedt laws incentivizes focus on these issues. The Lystedt laws bypass
regulating anything that would pressure leagues to prevent first
concussions, turning instead to the most deadly risk — second-impact
— implicitly assuming that a first impact is natural or unavoidable. It’s
almost as if the Lystedt law is deliberately designed to optimize an
inverse balance between a show of concern around the issue and
effective exploration of or incentive toward reduction and prevention of
overall youth concussion rates. Indeed, by granting immunity from tort
suits, Lystedt reduces pressure to focus on these safety adjustments that
might be expected from insurance companies. The leagues are
responding to public relations pressures and genuine concern for player
health and the ethical concerns of volunteer adults in the system, but
the concussed individuals will need to rely on these indirect pressures
rather than the state legislatures or private insurers to apply pressure
toward achieving the optimal safety measures.
This attribute of the Lystedt Laws — that they address only secondimpact, return to play rules — is remarkably consistent across the fifty
states, even as other aspects of the laws vary. Massachusetts is the only
jurisdiction that appears to address primary prevention. Its 2010
legislation provides:
A coach, trainer or volunteer for an extracurricular athletic
activity shall not encourage or permit a student participating in
the activity to engage in any unreasonably dangerous athletic
technique that unnecessarily endangers the health of a student,
including using a helmet or any other sports equipment as a
weapon.113
In every other state, the really difficult question is expertly deflected
by the Lystedt structure: What level of sports risk to the brain is

111 Kevin Seifert, Competition Committee to Recommend Cutting Kickoffs if Injury Rates
Don’t Drop, ESPN (Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22944176/
nfl-competition-committee-says-kickoffs-made-safer-recommend-eliminating-it.
112 Lindsey Tanner, Concussions Drop in Ivy League Football With Kickoff Change, AP
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/80fabd3fa99b476d98ea46460ebd25be.
113 MA. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 § 222(d) (2010). See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10149b (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1431(c) (2013) (explaining that Connecticut and
Vermont require training of coaches on how to make play safer, without requiring that
play be made safer).
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appropriate for children? We are dancing around the outside of this
difficult question culturally in the media and in communities as parents
and local youth sports organizations absorb the waves of information
on both the prevalence and the long-term consequences of concussions.
When a question is difficult culturally, we have several outlets where
we might place decisions against a backdrop of uncertainty. We might
regulate. We might let the tort system and insurance companies manage
a risk calculus and the development of a standard, without a legislative
grant of immunity. Or we might provide information and leave the
decision-making to individuals. But in the case of youth sports, the
individuals to whom we entrust the decisions are not the ones at risk.
This is not how we treat other culturally contested risks to youth, such
as alcohol or tobacco.
C. Lawsuits Before and After Lystedt
It was already difficult to sue school districts for sports injuries before
the Lystedt laws. Sports injuries are a known risk, to some extent, in
every sport, and concussed athletes need to overcome an assumption of
risk defense. While assumption of risk is disfavored in most areas of tort
law because of the emergence of comparative fault, sports participation
continues to be one realm where assumption of risk survives.114 We are
inclined to think that sports injuries result from inherent risks of the
sport and not from the negligent conduct of school authorities. But the
process of concluding that a risk is “inherent” rather than the result of
negligence can be conclusory, particularly when the idea that a risk is
inherent incorporates rules of play as though they have been and will
continue to be constant over time. In addition, many government
entities were already partially insulated from large judgments either by
damage caps or complete immunities for schools under certain
conditions.
Whatever the difficulties of suit were before, the Lystedt laws
narrowed the possibility of suit by extending immunity in many states
to those coaches and schools that comply with the return to play
protocol. In so doing, the Lystedt laws frame, define, and narrow the
duty to prevent injury, such that second-impact syndrome is the risk
that coaches, and insurers, must concern themselves with, to the
exclusion of other risks. Game or practice drills or strategies that
114 Timothy Davis, Avila v. Citrus Community College District: Shaping the Contours
of Immunity and Primary Assumption of the Risk, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259, 268
(2006); Keya Denner, Comment, Taking One for the Team: The Role of Assumption of the
Risk in Sports Tort Cases, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209, 209 (2004).
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increase the likelihood of an initial injury escape scrutiny under the
Lystedt framework, and are immunized from tort law. In focusing
energy on the admittedly crucial return to play decision, the Lystedt
laws cut off ordinary development of legal pressures on other aspects of
sports decision-making.
The NFL actively promoted Lystedt laws in state legislatures.115 One
study of the Lystedt policy-making process between 2009-2012
concludes:
that the NFL, through its unique role as a dominant interest
group, established the content of states’ youth sports TBI laws.
The NFL’s vigorous advocacy caused state legislatures to act
swiftly, which minimized the role of scientific evidence and
policy experimentation in the youth sports TBI lawmaking
process.116
Whether by design or result, these laws protect the continuation of
contact high school football programs by focusing on post-concussion
response rather than primary prevention and by immunizing athletic
programs from the lawsuits that might drive safety-enhancing change
in game rules. By framing the youth concussion risk as one of secondimpact prevention, Lystedt draws the attention of athletic leagues and
schools away from primary prevention, while lifting the common law
tort litigation risk that might have pressured those same actors to
consider primary prevention before the Lystedt structure was in place.
In their assigned role under the Lystedt laws, parents play an
underappreciated but essential part in furtherance of Lystedt’s status
quo protective operation, one that stretches rather than reflects the
conception of parents in other areas of law.
D. Lystedt as a Consent Law
Lystedt arms families with information that will help them to avoid
second-impact syndrome in their child. This seems like a prevention
framework. Yet I am arguing that we can treat the Lystedt laws as an
inform-and-consent framework, albeit a particularly weak and
incomplete one. This characterization requires some unpacking.
Arguably, Lystedt laws are more proactive than simple consents to
concussion risk, as they are designed to prevent return to play of a
concussed athlete. Second-impact syndrome is not the only way people
suffer from traumatic brain injury, but it has been identified as a
115
116

Goodell Sends Letter, supra note 85.
Harvey, supra note 3, at 85.
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particularly serious risk. On this view, the most important goal of
educating parents, coaches, and athletes is not to improve the quality of
their consent, but to make sure that they act appropriately after signs of
a first concussion. By contrast, the information in a typical waiver, for
example, includes an exhaustive list of risks, with no goal of reducing
many of those risks, but rather a legal aim of perfecting the waiver of
future liability for what comes to pass. Lystedt conveys risk ostensibly
for the purpose of enabling relevant actors to recognize a concussion
toward a different end: keeping an athlete off the field after one has
happened to prevent further injury. This distinguishes Lystedt from the
more typical consent to risk found in waivers. An examination of the
structure of Lystedt, however, indicates that it may formally be a
prevention statute, but its design points to an informal waiver of liability
or assumption of risk function.
In most states, parents in particular are signing statements that
indicate that they’ve received risk information about concussion.117 This
information sheet comes home in the same way other densely packed
waivers arrive on a parent’s table: this needs a signature or the child
can’t play. The form of the communication of information is the same
one used to execute a waiver of liability; indeed, almost all sports
programs require that a waiver is signed before participation, and the
two papers can come together and seem indistinguishable.
In addition, recall that forty-nine states require parents to receive this
information, more than the number of states that require the same of
athletes or coaches. The parent information requirement is the most
consistent across all of the Lystedt “inform” provisions. Yet the parent
is the only one of the three who may not be present when the injury
occurs and a removal from play decision needs to be made. If prevention
is the heart of Lystedt, coaches and referees would be the primary focus.
The universal focus on the parent begs some examination of the function
of Lystedt: parents contribute legitimacy to children’s risk more than
they bring an ability to prevent harm.
To underscore the ambiguity about why we inform parents under the
Lystedt framework, in fully eighteen states, the statute seems to require
the parent to return the concussion information to the school along
with the signature. That is to say, the information is not available to the
parent for reference throughout the season, ostensibly the time it would

117 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2) (2019) (“On a yearly basis, a concussion
and head injury information sheet shall be signed and returned by the youth athlete and
the athlete’s parent and/or guardian prior to the youth athlete’s initiating practice or
competition.”).
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be most useful.118 Consider the following examples of language in
versions of Lystedt legislation:
Oklahoma: On an annual basis, a concussion and head injury
information sheet shall be completed and returned to the school
district by the youth athlete and the athlete’s parent or guardian prior
to the youth athlete’s participation in practice or competition.119
Indiana: Each year, before beginning practice for an interscholastic
or intramural sport, a student athlete and the student athlete’s parent:
(1) must be given the information sheet and form described in
section 2 of this chapter; and
(2) shall sign and return the form acknowledging the receipt of
the information to the student athlete’s coach. The coach shall
maintain a file of the completed forms.120
Montana: A form documenting that educational materials referred to
in subsection (1) have been provided to and viewed by each youth
athlete and the youth athlete’s parent or guardian must be signed by
each youth athlete and the youth athlete’s parent or guardian and
returned to an official designated by the school district, nonpublic
school, or youth athletic organization prior to the youth athlete’s
participation in organized youth athletic activities.121
Pennsylvania: A student participating in or desiring to participate in
an athletic activity and the student’s parent or guardian shall each
school year, prior to participation by the student in an athletic
activity, sign and return to the student’s school an acknowledgment
of receipt and review of a concussion and traumatic brain injury
information sheet developed under this subsection.122

118 See Christine M. Baugh et al., Requiring Athletes to Acknowledge Receipt of
Concussion-Related Information and Responsibility to Report Symptoms: A Study of the
Prevalence, Variation, and Possible Improvements, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 297, 299-302
(2014).
119 S.B. 1700, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (noting that though in a 2016
version of the bill the statute was revised, but not particularly improved on this issue:
“On an annual basis, information regarding concussion and head injuries shall be
disseminated to the athlete and his or her parent or guardian. Acknowledgment and
understanding of the information shall be completed by the athlete and the athlete’s
parent or guardian and maintained by the school or the youth sports organization or
association prior to the athlete’s participation in practice or competition.”) (citing OKLA.
STAT. tit. 70, § 24-155(C)(1)-(2) (2016)).
120 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-34-7-3 (2019).
121 MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1303 (2017).
122 S.B. 200, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
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In some of these statutes, the instruction to return seems absolute,
while in others it leaves room conceptually for the development of a
tear-off sheet. Yet, the return of the signature is the statutory
requirement, and we might expect therefore that school systems will
focus on the aspect of the mandate that proves compliance. Their best
defensive strategy, and the most straightforward, is to put the signature
on the information sheet itself. A study of how this kind of statutory
language is implemented indicates that in these states, the entire
educational content is returned with the signature.123
For the concussion information to assist a parent who is trying to
make a decision about whether to seek medical attention for her child
or to discourage her child’s participation in practice or games after a hit
to the head, it would seem that the symptom list would be most useful
after the child has been permitted to participate in sports. This is
arguably a simple design flaw in the legislation. Forms that require
parental signatures in other contexts sometimes include a tear-off
portion that lets a family keep critical field trip details on a kitchen
counter, for example, while returning the permission signature. Lystedt
laws and structure should certainly correct this design flaw. But I
surface the flaw not solely to correct it, but because it reveals the
informed consent and waiver-like ethos behind the Lystedt structure
and operation.
Imagine, for example, a first aid instruction course that required
students to return all information upon completion. It’s unthinkable
that you’d try to create agency in amateur emergency first responders
by giving them first aid information and then take that information
away from them. The transparent incoherence of such a design suggests
that the structure of Lystedt is too substantially and too obviously
different from a first aid instruction to indicate that its core function is
first aid (or post-hit prevention of second-impact syndrome). The best
case statement of the purpose of Lystedt is to arm parents with an action
plan in the event of a concussion, but the function of Lystedt is to gain
parents’ informed acknowledgement of the risks and symptoms of
youth sports concussion. I return again to a quote by a prominent
scholar from the introduction to this Article, which says of Lystedt:
Such contrasting views [about risk] make it difficult for
policymakers to know what, exactly, to do. The policy challenge
going forward is thus to facilitate accurate communication of

123

See Baugh et al., supra note 118, at 301-02.
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risks and benefits to allow for informed athlete and parent
decision-making.124
In addition, the statutory requirements in some Lystedt information
packets are not limited to signs and symptoms of brain injury and
instructions to seek medical attention and follow return to play
protocols. They sometimes contain requirements that parents and
athletes receive explicit basic information about brain injuries in sports,
the kind of information that does not help families to prevent second
concussions and second-impact syndrome, but instead ensures that
they approach the activity with knowledge of its injury risk.125 This
additional information is of course essential if the parent signature is de
facto a waiver of liability. But the parent is not invited to view the
information provided as a decision point, in the way a parent is invited
to view waivers. The parts are there — risk information, and a fork in
the road — but in the case of a parental waiver, the parent is explicitly
invited to assume the relevant risk. Even though waivers of liability are
more direct in their purpose, courts are skeptical of enforcement given
the choice architecture in parental waivers of liability.126 The Lystedt
information is offered for more ambiguous purposes than a waiver of
liability, and its inferior design should lead to even more skeptical
reception. Instead, it leads to immunity from liability, a unique safe
haven for concussion harms not extended to other youth injuries.
Moreover, some implementing agencies use the term “informed
consent” in discussing the required Lystedt compliance documents. For
example, the original Zachary Lystedt law itself doesn’t use the words
“informed consent” because it is ostensibly aimed at second-impact
prevention. But the statute is implemented by the Washington State
Department of Health, where a five-point bullet list of compliance
requirements includes this language:
Informed consent must be signed by parents and youth athletes
about the dangers of sports-related head injuries.127

124

Shen, supra note 3, at 9.
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.0438(2)(e) (2018) (“An independent sanctioning authority
shall: (e) Adopt guidelines to educate athletic coaches, officials, administrators, and
youth athletes and their parents or guardians of the nature and risk of concussion and
head injury.”).
126 See infra Part IV.B.
127 Concussion
Management for Schools, WASH. ST. DEP’T HEALTH,
https://www.doh.wa.gov/CommunityandEnvironment/Schools/EnvironmentalHealth/
ConcussionManagement (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
125
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The statutory structure provides more benefit than just setting
families up for truly informed consent, of course, because the
information about second-impact risk and removal from play can save
lives. But even the removal from play and return to play protocol reflects
the format of informed consent: parents are urged to remove their child
from participation in the activity for the child’s benefit, but hand in
glove, parents will share the responsibility for any failure to do so or
any premature return to play, despite significant flaws in their capacity
to execute effectively in this area.128 It’s difficult to tease out the
difference between information that reduces injury and information
that implicates parents in the risks that their children face.
Consider one of the more in-depth statutory requirements for the four
pieces of information that a parent should receive:
(a) the nature and risk of brain injuries associated with athletic
activity;
(b) the signs, symptoms, and behaviors consistent with a brain
injury;
(c) the need to alert a licensed health care professional for
urgent recognition and treatment when a youth athlete exhibits
signs, symptoms, or behaviors consistent with a concussion;
and
(d) the need to follow proper medical direction and protocols
for treatment and returning to play after a youth athlete sustains
a concussion.129
This is all useful information, depending on the background ecology
in which it is offered. If risk is to be born entirely by athletes, better that
a parent is armed with this information than not, if the family is to have
a fighting chance at addressing the youth sports landscape effectively.
But the immunity from suit in the Lystedt structure hints at an effort to
decentralize responsibility for youth concussion risk, and in that
scheme, parents play not just a functional role but an ideological one,
for the benefit of anyone with a stake in the game.130 Parents are the fig
leaf, armed with information but not with the power to modify the
primary risk landscape. If a child is injured in sports, sports programs
128

See infra Part V.C.2.
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-7-1303 (2017).
130 Those with a stake in the game range from other athletes, their families, adults
invested in youth sports, and those professionally engaged in collegiate or professional
sports who need the pipeline to be well-supported.
129
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can point to Lystedt disclosures and signatures as evidence that risks
were knowingly undertaken, which is a core element of an assumption
of risk defense. Families cannot say they weren’t warned. At least in this
way, the Lystedt disclosures are the worst of all worlds. They defend
school systems and sports programs against the claim that parents were
not informed of risk, but they do not invite parents to explicitly consent
to concussion risk. Rather, parents are told they are preparing
themselves to take action after one has occurred. Nothing in the
structure of the disclosures invites families to make a conscious choice
about primary risk, but the structure allows us to feel later that they’ve
made one. The Lystedt paperwork returned by parents is inferior to a
waiver because it does not focus on the possibility of primary
prevention, nor does it explicitly invite a parental decision to accept or
reject that primary risk by using the formal language of waiver of
liability. Worse, the forms parents see do not put parents on notice that
ordinary negligence liability has been removed by statute solely for
concussion injury. While the Lystedt format is inferior to parental
waivers in these ways, the paperwork ritual is more consequential than
a formal parental waiver, because so many jurisdictions refuse to
enforce such waivers, while so many jurisdictions have nonetheless
insulated sports and medical entities from liability for the consequences
of a concussion.
IV. MEET THE PARENTS: THE FOUNDATION OF THE LYSTEDT
FRAMEWORK
This Part begins with a brief overview of the law of parental decisionmaking with respect to important health and risk choices on behalf of
their children. As many commentators have noted, it is exceedingly
difficult to make order out of the law of children’s capacity to make
decisions; wide variation across different contexts is difficult to
explain.131 Making matters worse, almost no legal scholarship working
to sort out children’s maturity and capacity independently elaborates a
full theory of the parent as decision-maker, except in contrast to the
child as decision-maker. Theory of parent law is less developed than
theory of child law with respect to decision-making legitimacy and

131 See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive
and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 275 (2006); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000); Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther,
Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 61 KAN. L. REV. 343 (2012).
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capacity.132 At this point, we can make only the claim that parents are
empowered to make highly significant decisions for children in some
contexts, but are constrained from doing so in other contexts. Parental
authority is strong but situational. I argue that a weak understanding of
parents in their legal role masks the risk of exploitation of their role by
external actors. Often, gaining parental consent protects third parties as
much if not more than it protects children. The Part then examines the
legal regime governing parental waivers of liability on behalf of
children, as the waiver framework is important to evaluating the Lystedt
structure.
A. The Rights of Parents to Make Decisions
The right of the parent to make child-rearing decisions is said to be
superior to anyone else’s rights. Parents have the right to direct their
child’s education,133 remove their children from state schools, choose
religious training for their children,134 impart parental moral values
regardless of their conformity to larger societal values, medicate their
child, determine the appropriate medical therapies for their child135 and
at times withhold medical treatment from their child,136 put their child
to paid or unpaid work at an appropriate age,137 discipline their child,138
132 See, e.g., KAREN WORTHINGTON, WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN: THE COMPETING
PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Martha A. Fineman & Karen Worthington
eds., 2009). But see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1 (1995); LINDA C. MCCLAIN &
DANIEL CERE, WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 41
(Linda McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013).
133 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Act at
issue unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the education of their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the 14th Amendment
protects the right of parents to engage with the teacher in educating their children).
134 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
135 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (“The fact that a child may balk at
hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does
not diminish the parents’ authority to decide what is best for the child.”).
136 In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(explaining that in life threatening situations, the state does at times override parental
authority over medical decisions).
137 E.g., Exemptions to the FLSA, DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/
youthlabor/exemptionsflsa (“Minors under age 16 working in a business solely owned
or operated by their parents or by persons standing in place of their parents, can work
any time of day and for any number of hours.”) (last visited July 8, 2019).
138 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (stating that parent’s use of
force is not criminal if it is used to promote the child’s welfare and is not designed or
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institutionalize their child,139 decide and limit with whom their child
may socialize and develop relationships,140 consent to the marriage of a
child,141 and control their child’s use of time.142
1.

Rationales for Parental Prerogatives

Though these parental decision-making rights have deep roots, there
is not a clear consensus over the reasons for that delegation that
operates consistently across contexts. In particular, it is not clear what
weight the child’s welfare is to be given in that delegation as against the
parent’s independent rights. At times the two are conflated, and at times
the law sees a distinction between the two, despite their vast overlap.
Both ideas can be seen informing the decision-making authority that
parents are given.
a.

Parenting on Behalf of the Child

From the child-welfare perspective, the parent is viewed as the one
closest to the child, whose interests most align with those of the child,
especially when compared with more detrimental actors such as the
state.143 Giving parents decision-making authority works to strengthen
the responsibility for care that operates hand in hand with the rights.
On this view, parents act as fiduciaries, as proxies for the child’s own
choice. I view this as a transitive relation principle: giving the benefit of
rights to parents gives the true benefit to the child.
There are many ways to say and explain this. According to the highly
influential work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit,
this is best expressed in the pure psychological form. Under that
framing, children’s needs include the assurance of a single consistent
authority:
known to create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury or extreme pain or
mental distress or gross degradation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 2019).
139 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
140 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
141 See Fraidy Reiss, Despite Progress, Child Marriage Is Still Legal in All 50 States,
N.Y. TIMES: ON THE GROUND (July 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://kristof.blogs.
nytimes.com/2017/07/26/despite-progress-child-marriage-is-still-legal-in-all-50-states/.
142 See generally Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
143 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (“The child is not the mere
creature of the state.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
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To safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as they
see fit, free of government intrusion, except in cases of neglect
and abandonment, is to safeguard each child’s need for
continuity.144
In this particularly clear formulation of the transitive relation principle,
there is no pretense that a parent’s decision-making authority rests on a
peculiar skill or knowledge. Instead, it is self-justifying in terms of the
child’s need for a singular and continuous authority figure.
Sometimes parents are instead presumed to possess an alignment of
interests due to both their love for the child and their knowledge of her
unique attributes that make them peculiarly skilled at decision-making:
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests
of their children.145
b.

Parenting as Self-determination

Yet in contrast to child-centered decision-making, the decisionmaking authority is sometimes described as a fundamental right of the
parents for their own sake. In the words of Charles Fried:
[T]he right to form one’s child’s values, one’s child’s life plan
and the right to lavish attention on that child are extensions of
the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things
for oneself.146
Fried identifies an important thread in parental decision-making
authority: “The liberty asserted by parents is not an aspect of selfdetermination, but rather a liberty to determine someone else’s.”147 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the U.S. Supreme Court validated parents’
independent interests in child-rearing over assertions of the child’s own
competing interest:
[O]ur holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of
the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the
144 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 7 (1973).
145
146
147

Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 150-52 (1978).
Id.
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parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for
failing to cause their children to attend school, and it is their
right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must
determine Wisconsin’s power to impose criminal penalties on
the parent . . . . [T]his case involves the fundamental interest of
parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the
religious future and education of their children.148
This strand of decision-making can be restated from a child-welfare
perspective, by indulging a fiction that what’s good for parents is good
for children. But it’s difficult to ignore that a part of the legal authority
given to parents includes rights for the parents’ benefit, because parents
“are entitled to maintain their offspring and seek meaning with and
through them.”149 Indeed, the Supreme Court cases that struggled with
parental consent to terminate a pregnancy noted that parents might
counsel a pregnant child toward the child’s best interest, or might have
independent parental interests that statutes empowering a veto to
abortion were designed to protect. That potential independent statutory
interest troubles the Court, but only because the interests of the child
in reproductive control enjoy a strong counterbalancing constitutional
weight. So in Planned Parent v. Danforth,150 in striking down a provision
that gave parents the right to veto a child’s decision to terminate a
pregnancy, the court considered the nature of the interest in parental
decision-making:
One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family unit and
of parental authority . . . . It is difficult, however, to conclude
that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a
determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to
terminate the patient’s pregnancy will serve to strengthen the
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will
enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty

148

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972).
Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of
the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980) (emphasis added).
150 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
149
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than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to
have become pregnant.151
The court explicitly recognizes the awkward reality that parents do
make decisions to help their children, and they also make decisions for
their own independent reasons. That the court gives more weight to the
child’s interests in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, and more weight to
the parents’ interests in Wisconsin v. Yoder, shouldn’t obscure the clarity
with which the court is able to separate the two interests and identify a
unique parental stake in childrearing that is not dependent on child
welfare and the transitive principle.152
Among the clearest, most troubling, and most controversial examples
of parental authority that engages parents’ independent interests is the
ability to consent on behalf of a child to marriage. Marriage is a
monumentally significant decision, often legalizing sexual relations
below an age of statutory consent, functionally authorizing teen
reproduction, and fundamentally altering the life course of a minor
child. Parental consent to marriage is considered necessary for minors
because they lack capacity to make this decision themselves, and in
most states parents are able to consent to the marriage of a minor child,
often at very young ages.153 The typical case of under-aged marriage in
the United States involves the pregnancy of a girl.154 It is difficult to
tease out the parental motivations for responding to a child pregnancy
by encouraging a child marriage. But a plausible explanation is that
child pregnancy triggers the independent experience of shame in the
parents. Those who do consent to the marriage of a minor girl
sometimes cite avoiding embarrassment as one reason for the marriage,
without distinguishing their own embarrassment from their
daughter’s.155 Yet a child’s sense of shame is rarely independent of a
151

Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Martha Albertson Fineman & George B. Shepherd, Homeschooling:
Choosing Parental Rights over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (2016).
153 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 64 P.3d 1056 (Nev. 2003).
154 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/
sunday/it-was-forced-on-me-child-marriage-in-the-us.html [hereinafter 11 Years Old];
see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(b) (2019) (allowing marriage at 15-yearsold if “the woman to be married . . . is pregnant or has given birth to a child”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-2.1(a) (2018) (allowing marriage at 14-years-old in cases of
pregnancy); State Dep’t of Human Resources v. Lott, 16 So. 3d 104, 107-08 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009) (explaining that pregnancy of a 13-year-old satisfies exception to minimum
age restrictions, approving her marriage to a 19-year-old).
155 Nicholas Kristof, An American 13-Year-Old, Pregnant and Married to Her Rapist,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/sunday/
152
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parent’s, because children are too immature to evaluate what’s
shameful. In the familiar effort to cover shame, courts and legislatures
are not asking whose embarrassment is at stake, as the parental
authority to make decisions in this realm is longstanding. But this
practice is under increased scrutiny. In the words of Nicholas Kristof,
“thousands of underage American girls . . . are married each year, often
sacrificing their futures to reduce embarrassment to their parents.”156
With respect to some types of decisions, parental authority is
remarkably strong, but in the context of parental consent to child
marriage, it has few defenders.
While contemporary discussions seem to embrace the conclusion that
it’s best to state the parent’s decision-making interest in child-centered
terms, this is hardly a triumph over adult interests. For example, parents
are able to consent to a blood, marrow, or organ donation by their child
for the benefit of that child’s sibling or half-sibling, as long as the parent
can say that the donation benefits the donor.157 Courts and other actors
in the legal system, though, are satisfied with “psychological benefit” to
the donor, and that is the routine formal explanation for deciding to
authorize the living transplant.158 It is difficult to imagine, however, that
in fact a parent is driven to consent to organ donation from her child to
her other child by the benefits to the donor, rather than the benefits to
the recipient child paired with an assessment that the harm to the donor
is less than that benefit. We may state her parental decision-making in
entirely child-centered terms, but we do not need to be blind to the role
of rhetoric in casting the parental authority in that particular light,
rather than acknowledging that we authorize parents to pursue their
own needs and interests through their children.
There are legal scenarios that put the divergence of child and parent
interests into stark contrast, such as the parent who takes a child actor
or athlete’s earnings for themselves.159 But most of the time it’s difficult

child-marriage-delaware.html [hereinafter 13-Year-Old]; see Kristof, 11 Years Old, supra
note 154 (discussing how parents may pressure their underage children into marriage).
156 Kristof, 13-Year-Old, supra note 155; see Kristof, 11 Years Old, supra note 154.
157 See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Curran v. Bosze,
566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969);
Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
158 See cases cited supra note 157.
159 See generally Danielle Ayalon, Note, Minor Changes: Altering Current Coogan Law
to Better Protect Children Working in Entertainment, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 351,
353 (2013) (discussing the history and need for Coogan Laws that protect child
entertainers from financial exploitation by parents, and the need to update those laws
to strengthen protections and close loopholes); Jessica Krieg, Comment, There’s No
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to make the distinction at play in this discussion between a parent
acting on a child’s behalf and acting on her own behalf, not because
some set of parents hide their self-interests so effectively, but because
the identity of child and parent are so intertwined, and the nature of
intention in this context so slippery, that the distinction doesn’t convey
a meaningful or useable category much of the time. Still, legislative
delegations of authority to parents, where they do become
controversial, need to be vetted for possible divergence between the
interests of a child and the interests of the parent.
2.

Established Limitations on Parental Decision-making with
Rationales

Parents make many decisions for their children, without a serious
evaluation of the rationale (be it a child-centered transitive relation, or
a parent’s prerogative), and whether the rationale is salient under the
given circumstances. Yet a substantial amount of child-protective law is
difficult to explain without the supposition that parents are not always
an adequate safeguard of children’s welfare. This is not necessarily
because parents are selfish and mean, but because they are embedded
in social and economic conditions, and they cannot be an expert in
everything.
Consider laws that require us to put our children in rearward facing
car seats in the back.160 If this is necessary to save my child’s life in an
accident, why on earth would I need a legal requirement to do so? No
parent wants to see their infant injured in a car accident, and one might
think parents are ideally situated to render a car seat law superfluous.
But something about parental decision-making is deemed faulty in that
context. Perhaps it is that the risk of injury is too great, meaning the
risk calculation weighs too heavily in one direction, or the risk balance
requires an engineering expertise that cannot be adequately taught to
parents in shorthand. But it may be that parents are systematically
flawed for this decision. They may predictably underestimate the risk
that this one trip will include an accident (optimism bias). Or the wellintentioned temptation of parents to soothe a child’s immediate and
sometimes urgently expressed need to be seen and heard and held can
be expected to overcome the regulatory cost-benefit analysis of long-

Business Like Show Business: Child Entertainers and the Law, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
429, 432 (2004).
160 What Does Your State Law Say About Car Seats?, SAFE RIDE 4 KIDS,
https://saferide4kids.com/car-seat-laws-by-state/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
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term risk underlying the car seat requirement. Slate Magazine reminds
us that a screaming baby is a powerful motivator:
Little — possibly no — research has been done on how much
more difficult it is to drive a car safely with a child shrieking out
the torments of the damned immediately behind the driver’s
seat, but anecdotally I can say that it doesn’t actually help.
Unless you’re really invested in car seat safety — which is to
say, unless you understand the dangers and respect the
recommendations and those who are making them — it’s
tempting to let car seats slide (or turn them around) in the name
of convenience and peace.161
For the parent of the screaming baby who wants to pick the child up,
or install the car seat facing forward so that the child can see the parent,
we think a legal mandate that runs contrary to parental impulse is
necessary to protect the child, and so we override the parent’s authority
to make risk assessments.162 Parents are imperfect decision-makers even
when compelled by a desire to help their child, and they may need more
than information to make a “right” choice in that context. Parents may
even appreciate being tied to the mast, so that they must resist their
baby’s siren song.
3.

Limits on Parental Authority When That Authority Functionally
Serves Third Parties

The entire universe of articulated reasons for legal deference to
parental decision-making authority, however, lies between the child’s
benefit and the parent’s benefit. There is no visible legal theory
supporting parental authority to benefit third party institutions,
whether they are schools, employers, hospitals, or recreational
organizations. What emerges if we organize limits on parental authority
by the intended beneficiary of a parent’s consent? When the intended
beneficiary is either the child or the parent, the law is situational in
adjusting the limits of parental authority. But when the functional
beneficiary appears to be a third party, the legal system should be more
161 KJ Dell Antonia, Safe, Sound, and Screaming Her Head Off, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2011,
1:26 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2011/03/safe-sound-and-screaming-herhead-off.html.
162 See, e.g., Lenore Skenazy, Thanks, New Jersey, For the Child Protection Laws That Are
Driving Me CRAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS (May 13, 2015), http://www.freerangekids.com/
thanks-new-jersey-for-the-child-protection-laws-that-are-driving-me-crazy/ (mentioning
that a group of parents engage in an interesting online discussion of whether car seat safety
has gone too far in constraining their parental freedom).
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skeptical of relying on parental authority, and ordinarily is more
skeptical.
For example, no parent tries to enforce a waiver of liability against a
recreational operator. Only the recreational operator seeks enforcement
of that parental waiver, and a majority of courts refuse to enforce
parental waivers despite purported parental authority.163 Courts and
legislatures should be, and arguably are, attentive to whether the
concept of parental authority is exploited to achieve the transfer of risk
from institutions to individuals more generally.
Consider child labor laws, which responded to a widespread problem
of children leaving school at young ages to toil in unsafe factory
conditions dangerous to their health and to their educational
development. Why on earth would a caring parent have allowed it? We
recognize that it’s an unfair question: economic conditions demanded
it, wage structures were developed in reliance on it, and as long as the
choice to put a child in the workforce was available, it was also very
difficult to avoid by even the most child-centered parent. The choice
architecture, put your child to work or starve, hardly sets the stage for
safe childhood, and few believed that parental consent to labor could
operate adequately to protect children. In the context of child labor,
parents are not inadequate because they are emotionally compelled to
respond to urgent need, as with the car seat, but because they are
embedded in the social and economic conditions of a race to the bottom.
Their freedom to put their children to work may be replacing the better
choice they wish they had. Child labor is understood to be benefitting
the employer, not the child or the parent, and parental consent should
not be deployed for that functional purpose.
If, as others have argued, paternalism can increase rather than
decrease real world options,164 child labor laws would be a good
example. The paternalistic removal of an option from the table in the
context of child labor laws added a different option that had not been
163

See infra Part V.B.
See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 541 (1952) (discussing how government, by its nature, involves
some control of the freedom of individuals in order to provide liberty for all); Bruce
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
(1982). A refusal to enforce a parental waiver or bend to parental consent is functionally
the same as requiring by statute a warranty of habitability — both limit the hypothetical
freedom to contract of the parties, but as a result, they enhance the sphere of
entitlements, rights, or benefits of those with no practical bargaining power.
164
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available before: remove your child from the workforce and earn an
adequate wage yourself to cover family expenses. Each time we attempt
to waive our child’s right to sue for personal injury so that the child can
participate in a physical activity, we can be said to be choosing the
activity over protection against negligence. What we’d really like is the
option that is not on the table: participation in activities with protection
from negligence. When we decide to let our children play youth football
and waive the child’s right to sue for personal injury, including
traumatic brain injury, we are not presented with the third option of
youth football redesigned to reduce primary injury risk, which might
be the most desirable option overall.
Sometimes, we see a legal practice that may be said to operate by using
parental authority for the benefit of outside actors or institutions.
Where we do, third parties are exploiting parental authority for their
own gain, expropriating its power without legitimately invoking its
underlying justifications. I would argue we can highlight that function
and cite it as a reason to question the legal allocation of parental
authority. The Lystedt Laws, I argue, are such a legal practice.
Parents do not enjoy absolute authority to do whatever they would
like to their children for a range of reasons, from their own selfishness
or aggression (consider child abuse laws), to their ignorance or
cognitive failures (consider the ability to properly calculate the car seat
risk for just this one trip), to their adaptive preference to the narrow
choice set in front of them (e.g., the child works or the family starves),
to their independent self-interests (e.g., a desire to become a
grandparent when a child is pregnant or to resolve moral questions in
favor of a parent’s morality), to the unjustified expropriation of their
legal power by institutional actors.
B. Parental Waiver of Liability
To assess where parental decisions around concussion risk fit into the
framework of parental decision-making more broadly, we need to
examine the law around parental waiver of liability to a minor, because
courts are skeptical of enforcing those parental releases and the Lystedt
framework bears a strong resemblance to parental waiver.
When adults sign a waiver releasing liability for negligence before
their own participation in a risky recreational activity, the vast majority
of states will enforce the waiver if it is well-written and the underlying
activity is not essential.165 State law varies in the scrutiny given to these
165 Only three states refuse to enforce any pre-injury releases of liability for negligent
injury to anyone. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
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agreements and conditions placed on the types of behavior that may be
released and in what contexts, but enforceability is the general rule.
But a parental waiver involves attempting to use parental authority to
contractually bind a third party, the child, and so the freedom of
contract concept of an agreement between the relevant parties to accept
a risk is not so easily applied. To complicate the matter further, if the
child herself signed the release, we would deny enforcement because
she lacks the capacity to contract as a minor.166 That inability to contract
arises out of both her immaturity and fears that immaturity will be
exploited by a third party, and we may read parental authority as the
proxy for that maturity. Yet making a decision for a child is one thing,
making a decision as if you are that child is another. There is no meeting
of the minds if judgment is substituted; in many contexts we engage a
legal fiction about the substituted judgment of parents, but in this nitty
gritty of contractual enforcement, courts do not think the parent can
bind the child to the agreement.
This means that we need to find the right to parental waiver of liability
somewhere other than in “as if” substitution for the child. Substituted
judgment may make more sense when a parent assumes a financial
liability for a child, by co-signing a loan, but injury to body is not a
transferrable interest. Rather, we need a justification anchored in the
independent judgment of the parent, and that justification has not been
easy for the courts to find.
Parents might be forgiven for assuming parental waivers are
important based on the amount of time they spend executing them, but
they are not ordinarily enforceable. The majority of courts that have
considered the issue have refused to enforce a parent’s pre-injury waiver
of a child’s negligence claim.167 The law is not universal. In 1990,
1-702 (2019); see also Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 86 Va. 975, 978
(1890). Several other states enforce agreements in theory but apply exceptionally high
standards to the conditions and types of businesses that may successfully use waivers
that they might be characterized as almost prohibiting enforcement altogether. See, e.g.,
Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 738 (Conn. 2005); Dalury v. S-K-I,
Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 797-98 (Vt. 1995).
166 See TIMOTHY MURRAY, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.2 (2019).
167 See, e.g., Mavreshko v. Resorts USA, Inc. 299 F. App’x 120 (3rd Cir. 2008);
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 92 F. 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1899); Kindermann v. LFT
Club Operations, Co., No. 16-11749, 2017 WL 2868542, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 5,
2017); Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 2010);
Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 358 (Fla. 2008); Meyer v.
Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Galloway v. State,
790 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 2010); Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me.
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California became the first state to enforce a parent’s pre-injury waiver
of liability,168 and since then several other state courts have followed
suit. In addition, a few state legislatures have overturned state court
decisions refusing to enforce waivers, most notably Colorado.169 On
some counts, since that 1990 California decision, up to a dozen states
have allowed enforcement of parental releases under some
circumstances. But this seriously overstates the norm, as most of these
changes were created by statute, and some are explicitly limited to a
single activity. For example, risk only from equine activities may be
released in six states by statute, and only from motorsport activities in
two states.170 A few states put such conditions on the release that its
enforceability is theoretical only. The Florida legislature, for example,
passed a statute that appeared to allow for enforcement of parental
waivers only by nonprofit operators, but not commercial entities, but
that in effect refuses enforcement of all negligence waivers; the statute
limits commercial releases to injury resulting from inherent risks of the
activity, expressly excluding injuries that arise from negligence, and
reverts nonprofit waivers to the common law, which had already
refused to enforce them.171 Since there shouldn’t be liability for injuries

1979); Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 2010); Khoury v. Saik, 33 So.
2d 616, 618 (Miss. 1948); Perry v. SNH Dev., No. 2015-CV-00678, 2017 N.H. Super.
LEXIS 32, at *13 (Sept. 13, 2017); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 38990 (N.J. 2006); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., 172 N.E.2d
283, 284-85 (N.Y. 1961); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800, 804 (Or. 1960);
Shaner v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 40 Pa. D. & C.4th 308, 313-14 (Dauphin C.P.
1998), aff’d without opinion, 738 A.2d 535 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); Blackwell v. Sky
High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC, 523 S.W.3d 624, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017);
Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245, 247
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Munoz v. II Jaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex. App. 1993);
Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort,
834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992).
168 See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649-50 (Ct. App.
1990).
169 See Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1236 (Colo. 2002); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-107 (2019).
170 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-553 (2019) (equine activities); GA. CODE ANN. § 412-4 (2019) (equine activities); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-10.95 (2019)
(motorsports); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (2019) (equine activities); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-28-3 (2019) (automobile and motorcycle racing); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 247.4027(2)(a) (2019) (equine activities); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-203(2)(b)
(2019) (equine and livestock activities); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6202 (2018) (equine
activities).
171 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.301(3) (2019); Kirton v Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 358 (Fla.
2008).

246

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:197

without negligence in any case, the Florida legislature has made no
meaningful concession to tort defendants.
Reasons for refusal to enforce these parental waivers are instructive
as we consider their relevance to the Lystedt structure. I would
characterize one set of objections to these releases as grounded in safety
incentives, a concern that influences non-enforcement of releases for
adults as well: if recreational operators can be released from their own
negligence, they will lack incentives toward safe operation, and for some
types of accidents, they are the cheapest or only cost-avoider.172 They
may, for example, control completely the premises and the conduct of
the activity, akin to the rules of play in sports. Therefore, removing the
incentive to safety imposed by tort law from the outfitter and placing it
on the participant functionally reduces safety.
But other types of arguments for not enforcing parental waivers of
liability are grounded in the parent-child relationship and the difficulty
of a person consenting to risk on behalf of another person, and thereby
binding that person to a contract to suffer the losses as an individual.
The parent-child relationship, and the extensive authority granted to
parents in family law, do not extend to this risk contract.
1.

Children’s Legal Affairs

Common law courts continue to scrutinize parental management of
children’s legal affairs in an explicit effort to police the risk of parental
mismanagement. For example, generally, parents lack the authority to
waive a legal right to child support on behalf of their children without
judicial approval. In the pre-injury waiver context, some courts reason
that waivers cannot be enforced because of the limited authority of
parents over their children’s legal affairs, referencing the independent
legal protection for children from parental decisions.173 With respect to
personal injury, adults may settle their own post-injury tort claims and
waive liability without court approval, but if a parent seeks to settle a
claim for injury to her child, that settlement must be approved by a

172

See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 744-45 (Conn. 2005).
See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 2010); see also 39 AM.
JUR. 2D Guardian & Ward § 115 (2019); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 40 (2019).
173
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court.174 This has been a longstanding and relatively explicit limitation
on the legal authority of parents.175
A version of the rationale grounded in established limits on authority
in contractual contexts notices that the parental signature may function
on behalf of the party in opposition to the child, and inappropriately
use the child’s interests in that process. On this reasoning, parental
authority to waive liability would not be in the child’s interest, and the
parent has no right to strike a legal bargain for that actor’s benefit at the
expense of her child:
[W]hen a parent decides to execute a pre-injury release on
behalf of a minor child, the parent is not protecting the welfare
of the child, but is instead protecting the interests of the activity
provider.176
The possibility that a third party is deploying parental authority or
parental autonomy — and will always be the party doing so in court
under the contractual structure of a parental waiver of liability —
appears to be adequate justification for refusal to enforce it.177
2.

Comparing Pre- and Post-injury Releases

For many courts, the baseline then is whether there is a difference
between pre- and post-injury releases that would justify different
treatment. Courts who use the post-injury release as a baseline of
comparison often find it difficult to explain why a pre-injury release

174 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND CHILD § 41 (2019) (stating that a parent has no right,
in the absence of authorization from a court, to release or compromise causes of action
belonging to a minor); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 90.2 (2019); D.C. CODE Ann. § 21120(a) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 744.301, 744.387, 744.3025 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN.
5.636 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-3-3 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.280 (2019);
MD. CODE ANN., Capacity § 3-202 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 140C 1/2 (2019);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 2.420 (2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 803.01, 807.10 (2019);
Gillikin v. Gillikin, 113 S.E.2d 38, 44 (N.C. 1960) (explaining that a minor cannot be
bound by proposed compromise and settlement of a minor’s personal injury claim
unless it is properly approved by a judge); see also Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 738
N.E.2d 964, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1051,
1055 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (affirming lower court’s decision to appoint a guardian in
parents place when the parents refused to accept a pre-trial settlement on behalf of their
child for damages associated with cerebral palsy because the lower court judge could
not “let anybody, no matter how well-intentioned or sincere in their convictions,
gamble for this child”).
175 See 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND CHILD § 41 (2019).
176 Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 357.
177 See id.
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should be enforceable when a post-injury release is not. The Utah
court’s reasoning on this issue is fairly typical:
[W]e see little reason to base the validity of a parent’s
contractual release of a minor’s claim on the timing of an injury.
Indeed, the law generally treats preinjury releases or indemnity
provisions with greater suspicion than postinjury releases. An
exculpatory clause that relieves a party from future liability may
remove an important incentive to act with reasonable care.
These clauses are also routinely imposed in a unilateral manner
without any genuine bargaining or opportunity to pay a fee for
insurance. The party demanding adherence to an exculpatory
clause simply evades the necessity of liability coverage and then
shifts the full burden of risk of harm to the other party.
Compromise of an existing claim, however, relates to
negligence that has already taken place and is subject to
measurable damages. Such releases involve actual negotiations
concerning ascertained rights and liabilities. Thus, if anything,
the policies relating to restrictions on a parent’s right to
compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in
the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario.178
The Utah court blends substantive reasons for denying enforcement of
waivers altogether, such as dis-incentivizing safety, with a head-to-head
comparison of the different bargaining environments pre- and postinjury.179 Yet the underlying principle that both agreements test the
ability of parents to extinguish legal claims remains for courts in most
states.
3.

Lack of Alignment Between Parent and Child Interests

Some courts that reject enforcement of parental waivers reason
simply that we shouldn’t assume parental interests are aligned with their
children’s, because it “cannot be presumed that a parent who has
decided to voluntarily risk a minor child’s physical well-being is acting
in the child’s best interest.”180 This framing seems to anticipate an actual

178

Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001) (citation omitted).
Admittedly, post-injury settlements require judicial scrutiny in part for fear that
parental interest in money will override their interest in child welfare, and the pre-injury
context is different because there is no concrete monetary figure evidently at stake in
the moment of agreement.
180 Kirton, 997 So.2d at 357.
179
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split of interests between parent and child. One New York court put the
question of divergence of parental and child interests this way:
[W]e are extremely wary of a transaction that puts parent and
child at cross-purposes and, in the main, normally tends to
quiet the legitimate complaint of the minor child.181
4.

Parental Incompetence

A more measured version of this kind of blunt assessment on the
merits is reflected in the reasoning of a number of the courts that have
rejected enforcement not because parents are self-interested, but
because their sometimes poor judgment cannot come at the expense of
the child. Acknowledging that a parent can make a bad decision on
behalf of a child, who would be unjustifiably harmed as a result, one
court posited, “children still must be protected against parental actions
— perhaps rash and imprudent ones — that foreclose all of the minor’s
potential claims for injuries caused by another’s negligence.”182
These opinions expressly contemplate the possibility of wellintentioned but poor parental judgment in signing waivers, and assert
the authority to override that judgment on behalf of the minor child:
These limitations on parents’ authority to make legally
enforceable transactions affecting the property and financial
interests of their minor children are derived from a wellestablished public policy that children must be accorded a
measure of protection against improvident decisions of their
parents.183
Three courts that have allowed enforcement of parental waivers have
done so on the theory that respect for fundamental parental rights and
authority compel respecting a parent’s decision to waive her child’s
ability to sue for negligence before it has occurred. These courts deploy
parental rights language on behalf of the commercial actors with whom
the parents contracted.184 The Colorado legislature overturned a state

181 Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 283, 285 (N.Y.
1961).
182 Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Colo. 2002), superseded by
statute, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-107(1)(b) (2019).
183 Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 2010).
184 See Saccente v. LaFlamme, No. CV0100756730, 2003 WL 21716586, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2003); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Rosen, 80 A.3d 345, 353
(Md. 2013); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 746 (Mass. 2002).
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court opinion holding parental waivers were unenforceable,185 and the
statutory text uses the same parental rights language:
(IV) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of
their children concerning the risks and benefits of participation
in activities that may involve risk;
(V) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children
that should not be ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary
and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as
decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious
education.186
While the Colorado legislature and a few courts do use the elevated
parental rights language, most courts that will enforce parental waiver
do not premise enforcement on parental rights, but rather on the
practical regulatory burden of tort law.
5.

Concern About Reducing Access to Recreational Opportunities

By far the most common reason cited in the literature and in cases for
allowing enforcement of these agreements is not fundamental parental
rights, but practical incentives.187 The few courts that do enforce
parental waivers reason that without them, recreational opportunities
will be eliminated or diminished. It appears not only in the cases, but
in discussion of releases among lawyers and in the business community.
An Ohio court, in choosing to enforce a parental waiver, makes the
argument clearly:
Therefore, we conclude that although Bryan, like many children
before him, gave up his right to sue for the negligent acts of
others, the public as a whole received the benefit of these
exculpatory agreements. Because of this agreement, the Club was
able to offer affordable recreation and to continue to do so without
the risks and overwhelming costs of litigation. Bryan’s parents
agreed to shoulder the risk. Public policy does not forbid such
an agreement. In fact, public policy supports it. Accordingly, we
believe that public policy justifies giving parents authority to
enter into these types of binding agreements on behalf of their
185

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-107(1)(b) (2019).
Id. at § 13-22-107(1)(a)(IV)-(V).
187 See Joshua D. Arters & Ben M. Rose, Kindly Remove My Child from the Bubble
Wrap — Analyzing Childress v. Madison County and Why Tennessee Courts Should
Enforce Parental Pre-Injury Liability Waivers, 11 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 8, 57 (2016).
186
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minor children. We also believe that the enforcement of these
agreements may well promote more active involvement by
participants and their families, which, in turn, promotes the
overall quality and safety of these activities.188
The court views the risk transfer as being from the Club to Bryan’s
parents, rather than to Bryan himself, treating the substituted judgment
as equivalent to substituted pain. This claim from regulatory overburden is on the one hand intuitive to any lawyer arguing from basic
incentives, and yet intuitively inaccurate to any non-lawyer parent who
sees a proliferation of recreational activities for youth in those majority
of states that refuse to enforce waivers. This potentially important
argument for enforcing agreements loses force if recreational
opportunities remain robust and wide-ranging in states that do not
enforce parental waivers. It’s difficult to detect the marginal increase in
opportunities that the theory hypothesizes.
I could not find any empirical study of the question of whether there
was in fact any difference in recreational opportunities between states
that do and do not enforce these agreements. Given that most states do
enforce them for adults and don’t enforce them for children, we might
expect to see most states having a substantial number of recreational
outfits that have limited their operations to adults capable of signing an
effective waiver of liability. I could find one activity, sky-diving, that
tends to be limited to adults, but this is regardless of state. The
governing safety rating association for the industry has determined that
it is unsafe to jump under the age of eighteen, and will not license
instructors who would teach a minor,189 so it doesn’t seem appropriate
to attribute that age restriction to the state of waiver law without more
evidence.
While direct study of the question is unavailable, indirect evidence
does not appear to support the concern. There is no detectable pattern
of recreational, athletic, or wilderness opportunity disparity between
states that do and do not enforce parental waivers, and all states that do
not enforce them appear to have a wide array of these opportunities.190
188 Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) (emphasis
added).
189 See U.S. PARACHUTE ASS’N, SKYDIVER’S INFORMATION MANUAL 5 (2018),
https://uspa.org/Portals/0/files/Man_SIM.pdf.
190 In two states that do not enforce either parental or adult waivers, Montana and
Louisiana, we find that they do not have the lowest high school athletic participation rates.
The national average of high school athletic participation is 60%. In comparison, in Louisiana
55% of high school students participated in athletics, and Montana 76%. Compare Table
203.30. Public School Enrollment in Grades 9 Through 12, by Region, State, and Jurisdiction:

252

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:197

Additionally, non-enforcement states do not appear to have lower youth
athletic opportunities than comparable states that have not declared
their unwillingness to enforce waivers.191 Finally, there does not seem
to be a decrease in outdoor reactional activities in states that do not
enforce adult waivers.192 The circumstantial evidence tends to
Selected Years, Fall 1990 through fall 2028, NAT’L CTR. EDU. STATS.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_203.30.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2019)
(containing the number of high school students per state in 2015-16) with 2016-17 High
School Athletics Participation Survey, NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N,
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/201617_Participation_Survey_Results.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (listing the 2016-17 high school athletic participation rate,
including individuals who participated in two sports counted twice, three sports counted
three times, etc.).
191 For example, when comparing USA Football Leagues per state, Montana, which
does not enforce waivers, has fifty-nine USA Football affiliated leagues; Idaho, a
comparable state that has taken no position on parental waivers, has fifty leagues;
Louisiana has ninety-six leagues and does not enforce parental waivers; Virginia has
179 and does not enforce parental waivers; while Delaware, which leans toward
enforcing waivers, has thirty. Find a Heads Up League, USA FOOTBALL,
https://usafootball.com/resources-tools/heads-up-football-finder/ (last visited July 9,
2019). Adjusting these figures for variation in population size doesn’t produce a more
conclusive pattern. For example, Idaho has a larger population than Montana, and a
theoretically friendlier legal climate on parental waivers, but has fewer football
opportunities either absolutely or per capita. The Delaware and Virginia comparisons
are about equal proportionally to the population differences. The number of leagues
isn’t a direct product of the number of players, but it’s the most reliable figure available
to capture any feared reduction in opportunity. Similarly, there do not appear to be
fewer youth soccer opportunities in declared non-enforcing states. In Montana, where
waivers are not enforced, there are thirty-five youth soccer leagues affiliated with the
state’s soccer association and in Idaho, which is undeclared on parental waivers, there
are twelve. In Virginia, where there is no enforcement, there are 116, and in Delaware,
which leans toward waiver enforcement, there are thirteen, a ratio directly proportional
to their population differences. See Hong v. Hockessin Athletic Club, No. N12C-05-004
PLA, 2012 WL 2948186, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012) (enforcing a waiver). In
Louisiana, there are forty-two and in Mississippi there are fifty-one, though parental
waivers are not enforced in either. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (1985); Burt v. Burt,
841 So. 2d 108, 115 (Miss. 2001) (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Khoury v. Saik, 33 So. 2d 616, 618 (Miss. 1948)).
192 For example, in 2017, 81% of Montana residents and 70% of Minnesota residents
participated in outdoor recreational activities. Montana, OUTDOOR RECREATION ECON.
REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017; Minnesota, OUTDOOR
RECREATION ECON. REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017. However,
unlike Montana, Minnesota does enforce adult liability waivers. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.055 (2019). Similarly, 57% of Virginia residents and 52% of New York residents
participated in outdoor recreational activities. Virginia, OUTDOOR RECREATION ECON.
REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017; New York, OUTDOOR RECREATION
ECON. REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017. Virginia and New York
are similar states and they have comparable percentages; however, New York enforces
liability waivers and Virginia does not. See Lago v. Krollage, 575 N.E.2d 107, 110 (N.Y.
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undermine the claim that youth opportunities to participate in athletic
leagues will decline in states that have held that they will not enforce
parental liability waivers.193
A sample of information yields no evidence that the enforceability of
pre-injury waivers impacts overall recreational opportunities. Looking
at the number of youth athletic leagues and participation and looking
at overall outdoor recreational participation surfaced no evidence that
residents of states that do not enforce liability waivers have a decreased
opportunity to participate in recreational activities.
We use the term canard to indicate that an idea is both popular and
unfounded. There’s a sound economic theory that would indicate that
we need parental waivers to be enforced in order to ensure that we have
adequate, or optimal, levels of recreational opportunity. Lack of
evidence that the widespread failure to enforce parental waivers is
having such an effect undermines the intuitive economic claim. As the
Supreme Court of Iowa said in 2010:
We believe the fear of dire consequences from our adoption of
the majority rule is speculative and overstated. We find no
reason to believe opportunities for recreational, cultural, and
educational activities for youths have been significantly
compromised in the many jurisdictions following the majority
rule. In the final analysis, we conclude the strong public policy
favoring the protection of children’s legal rights must prevail
over speculative fears about their continuing access to
activities.194
If parental consent to waive liability for injury to a child cannot be
explained by efforts to produce a more optimal level of recreational
activities, the argument against enforcement, given the problem of
substituted judgment, is greatly strengthened. Though some courts
have moved toward enforcement of parental liability waivers, the
majority continue to see little benefit to revising the common law rule
against giving parents that authority.

1991). Also, Montana is the state with the second highest proportion of recreational
workers in the country, yet does not enforce liability waivers for either adults or
children participating in recreational activities. Occupational Employment and Wages,
May 2018, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/oes/
current/oes399032.htm.
193 This is an anecdotal tour of opportunities for recreational activity and the
underlying state law of waivers; it is not a study.
194 Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Iowa 2010).
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Indeed, the failure to enforce waivers is a paternalism that enhances
functional choice of parents even as it impairs theoretical choice. As
between amusement rides with a waiver of negligence claims and no
amusement rides at all, parents seem to choose the amusement ride time
and again. But the choice they’d prefer is the amusement ride without a
waiver of the protections of negligence law, and the formal choice
limitation is functionally choice-enhancing in just the way child labor
laws and warranties of habitability are. That is the state of law
surrounding parental waivers of liability.
C. Parallels Between Waivers and Lystedt
If parents lack the capacity to waive liability before a child can
participate in a recreational activity, what is the premise of the Lystedt
framework, and is it consistent with waiver law? In Part III.D, I argued
that Lystedt is a worst-of-both-worlds hybrid between a waiver and a
first aid/prevention provision.
On one reading of waiver law, parents lack the capacity to make a
decision for their child because their judgment isn’t adequately
protective in that risk balancing context. Lystedt requires that risk
information be conveyed to parents, which would improve their
decision-making. At the same time, it’s already a staple of waiver law
that waivers need to convey detailed risk information. Lystedt’s
information component isn’t an improvement over the kinds of
information conveyed in a well-drafted waiver form.
In other ways, the Lystedt structure compares unfavorably to parental
waivers of liability in terms of ensuring a good decision-making
structure and adequate protection of child welfare. First, parents do not,
under the Lystedt structure, actually sign a waiver of liability. They
ordinarily sign an independent waiver of liability for all sports injuries,
one that is ordinarily not enforceable but may nonetheless influence a
parent’s litigation behavior. But the information provided with Lystedt
doesn’t flag for the parent that the parent and child are assuming the
risks enumerated, the way a waiver does. This is particularly
problematic because so many states include immunity from tort in their
Lystedt statutes so long as coaches follow return to play rules, so that
participation itself triggers an actual waiver of liability. Yet there is no
moment when the parent recognizes that statutory immunity has been
granted. More important, Lystedt information does not explicitly invite
a parent to decline participation altogether, even though implicitly
every parent must realize that withdrawing is an option. Instead,
Lystedt is focused on what to do after a concussion occurs, which has
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the potential to lead parents to believe that second-impact syndrome is
the primary threat to their children’s welfare.
This does not prove that there is something nefarious behind the
Lystedt legislation. Rather, it is to say that taken together, the structure
of the information and the decision-making prompts are inferior to the
typical waiver of liability. Given that courts tend to assess parental
waivers of liability with great skepticism, Lystedt represents a
noteworthy departure from the typically circumscribed parental role in
this setting. That it is achieved legislatively, as an intervention on
common law decision-making, means that the immunity from tort
extended here functions as an exception to the general ability of parents
to sue for negligently caused sports-related injuries to their children.
Is something else afoot with the Lystedt legislation? Legal and
cultural commentary around the concussion issues is infused with
deference: where the issue becomes knotty, defer to the parents.
Consent becomes a remedy for the cultural tensions around sports and
threats to children’s health. That Lystedt delivers a tort immunity to
athletic organizations without notifying families that it has done so
raises questions about who the legislation is designed to protect, and
how parents are utilized in that process.
V.

CONSENT AND THE YOUTH SPORTS PARENT

Many NFL and college football viewers feel conflicted about the
concussion situation in football today. The New York Times Magazine
asked the concussion-driven question on many viewers’ minds in an
essay entitled, “Is It Immoral to Watch the Super Bowl?”195 Viewers
appreciate a pathway “out” from the destruction/entertainment
conundrum — a narrative that absolves the viewer of implication in
harm to the players. That “out” might be somewhere between a
psychological convenience and a psychological imperative for the
viewer. It can be located in the consent of the players themselves.
Without belief in player consent to their own destruction, the
immorality of football feels inescapable.
The significance of player consent to the industry’s
destruction/entertainment conundrum becomes visible in the
concussion litigation by former NFL players against the league and in

195 See Steve Almond, Is It Immoral to Watch the Super Bowl?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/magazine/is-it-immoral-to-watch-the-superbowl.html.
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the widely discussed book and documentary “League of Denial.”196 Both
League of Denial and the NFL concussion litigation focus on NFL
conduct in concealing the true risk of concussion from players even
when league officials either knew or should have known that the risk
was greater than they were conveying. The NFL efforts to minimize the
risk are explicitly likened to the efforts of the tobacco industry to hide
the risks of their products from their consumers.
On this framing, the NFL’s misconduct is not in exposing players to a
one in three risk of brain damage, or a 90% risk of headaches, but in
exposing them to that risk without their informed consent. The NFL
concussion settlement only covers retired players, who claimed that the
NFL concealed information that is now widely available to current
players who presumably consent to risk in the face of more widespread
information.197 In keeping with this theory of the wrong, the NFL
changed course in its messaging, from directly denying the harm to its
players prior to 2009, to investing in concussion research, changing
game rules and return to play protocol, and generally endeavoring to
stay in front of the issue for current players. The NFL’s new position is
to gather and share as much information as possible with players and
the public, shoring up the quality of player consent with better
information. Implicitly, viewers are invited to resolve the
destruction/entertainment conundrum the same way: today’s NFL
players are more aware of what they are risking, and have chosen to play
for money and the glory of the game; it would be raw paternalism for
the viewer to second-guess that choice. The conundrum is resolved by
libertarianism, deployed to reduce viewer responsibility for football’s
harms. While football is the epicenter of this narrative, it can arise in
other spectator sports, as was apparent during the World Cup in the

196 MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL (2013); LEAGUE OF
DENIAL: THE NFL’S CONCUSSION CRISIS (Frontline 2013).
197 Claims in NFL Concussion Settlement Hit $500 Million In Less Than 2 Years, CBS
NEWS (July 30, 2018, 7:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nfl-concussion-claimshit-500-million-less-than-2-years/; Patrick Hruby, The NFL Dodges on Brain Injuries,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/09/
the-nfls-concussion-settlement-not-acceptable/379557/.
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summer of 2014,198 and reflected in the much smaller National Hockey
League settlement with a class of retired players in 2018.199
The NFL’s framework of informed consent and assumption of risk are
not unique to professional athletes. They are a blueprint for
understanding the response to youth concussion as well. The current
structure of intervention in youth sports seems to translate those same
cultural ideas around consent to youth sports.
A. Who Is the Youth Sports Parent?
Popular characterization of sports parents tell us that they are
competitive, aggressive, and care way too much about their child’s
placement on the most competitive team and then about seeing that
team win.200 The problem of the youth sports parent is well-ensconced
in the discourse and practice of youth sports. Media reporting, pleas
from coaches on sports blogs, and formal parental codes of conduct all
reflect a sense that there is an issue to be addressed. Unpacking the
cliché and examining what we do know about the sports parent
phenomenon may help us to evaluate whether there is anything
distinctive about parents in the sports context that would influence
their role in the Lystedt structure.
Research suggests a divide between child athletes and their parents
with respect to the value of youth sports, with the children less focused
on competition, winning, and status, and more focused on fun, while
parents are focused on seeking the most competitive environment the
child can attain. Scholars are digging into what children say about the
attributes of fun, and competition and winning are very far down their
list.201 Much has been made in recent years of a study finding that 70%
of youth athletes have quit their sport by age thirteen, 202 citing lack of
fun as the main driver of their decisions. Studies suggest children
experience unwanted pressure to play and to perform as athletes from
198 See Marissa Payne, Brazilian Soccer Star Bellini Has CTE Diagnosed, Just as FIFA
Revamps Concussion Protocol, WASH. POST. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2014/09/23/brazilian-soccer-star-bellini-hascte-diagnosed-just-as-fifa-revamps-concussion-protocol/.
199 See Stephen Whyno, Retired Players, NHL Reach Settlement in Concussion Lawsuit
in Minnesota, INS. J. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
midwest/2018/11/13/507374.htm.
200 Rosenwald, supra note 18.
201 Amanda J. Visek et al., The Fun Integration Theory: Toward Sustaining Children
and Adolescents Sport Participation, 12 J. PHYSICAL ACTIVITY & HEALTH 422 (2015).
202 Pressure & Youth Sports Study, YELLOWBRICK, https://www.yellowbrickprogram.
com/blog/pressure-youth-sports-study (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
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coaches, parents, and teammates that contributes to their exit from the
field.203 Parental behavior impacts children’s sports experience, often
negatively.204 Public health officials are concerned about the subsequent
lack of physical activity by those who exit organized sports, and the
negative health consequences for the child.205 In this light, research on
the role parental pressure plays in a child’s enjoyment of the sport
becomes highly relevant, because the child’s enjoyment is the key
determinant of her continued participation.
A central lament among researchers is that children now begin
competitive sports at too young an age and specialize too quickly,206 in
a marked shift from a generation ago.207 This specialization, in turn, is
tied to a significant increase in injuries, particularly orthopedic injuries
from repetitive overuse.208 Because this increased specialization is now
infused throughout the youth sports culture, isolating the causal
determinants is difficult. In an effort to understand the movement
toward specialization, researchers have focused on parental decisionmaking, and found that parents are a key determinant in the decision to
specialize in a single sport at an early age.209
203

See id.
Diana Amado et al., Incidence of Parental Support and Pressure on Their Children’s
Motivational Processes Towards Sport Practice Regarding Gender, PLOS ONE 10, June
2015; Julien E. Bois et al., The Influence of Parenting Practices and Parental Presence on
Children’s and Adolescents’ Pre-competitive Anxiety, 27 J. SPORTS SCI. 995, 1002-03
(2009); D. K. Chan et al., Influences of Coaches, Parents, and Peers on the Motivational
Patterns of Child and Adolescent Athletes, 22 SCANDINAVIAN J. MED. & SCI. SPORTS 558,
565-66 (2011); Ajay S. Padaki et al., Quantifying Parental Influence on Youth Athlete
Specialization: A Survey of Athletes’ Parents, ORTHOPAEDIC J. SPORTS MED. 1, 4-5 (2017);
Pedro A. Sánchez-Miguel et al., The Importance of Parents’ Behavior in Their Children’s
Enjoyment and Amotivation in Sports, 36 J. HUMAN KINETICS 169, 174 (2013).
205 See Visek et al., supra note 201, at 424.
206 Neeru Jayanthi et al., Sports Specialization in Young Athletes: Evidence-Based
Recommendations, 5 SPORTS HEALTH 251, 251 (2013).
207 See id.
208 Id. at 255; John P. DiFiori et al., Overuse Injuries and Burnout in Youth Sports: A
Position Statement from the American Medical Society for Sports Medicine, 48 BRITISH J.
SPORTS MED. 287 (2014); Daniel B. Hollander et al., Psychological Factors Associated with
Overtraining: Implications for Youth Sport Coaches, 18 J. SPORTS BEHAVIOR 3, 3 (2010)
(emphasizing the psychological harm related to overtraining in youth sports); Anthony
S. Kaleth & Alan E. Mikesky, Impact of Early Sport Specialization: A Physiological
Perspective, 8 J. PHYSICAL EDU. RECREATION & DANCE 29, 31-32 (2010); A Mehran
Mostafavifar et al., Early Sport Specialisation, Does It Lead to Long-Term Problems?, 47
BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 1060, 1060 (2013).
209 See Padaki et al., supra note 204, at 4; Rosenwald, supra note 18; see also Earl
Smith, A Hoop Dreams Reality Check, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:30 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/10/childrens-sportslife-balance/ahoop-dreams-reality-check.
204
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One often-cited explanation for parental over-investment in sports is
a misperception that their child will be eligible for financial aid as a
collegiate athlete if the appropriate levels of play are achieved in
childhood.210 On this theory of parental misbehavior, parents simply
make a factual miscalculation about their child’s likelihood of success,
which leads to a decision equation with bad data inputs, or optimism
bias.211 Parents compound the problem by overspending on youth
athletic programs in the belief that it’s a sound financial investment.212
Several studies show a concerning prevalence of parents spending on
youth sports in place of saving for higher education,213 and sometimes
raiding their own retirement funds to do so.214 That spending, in turn,
places pressure on the child, which is linked to burnout and withdrawal
from sports.215
Parents drive their children to excel in other arenas as well — music
and academics, for example. For each, we might evaluate whether
parents accurately judge the costs and benefits of the child’s investment
level, and even judge the academic investment as offering a higher
payoff than the athletic investment. This all assumes, though, that the
parent is acting on behalf of the child, calculating properly, or
improperly.
B. Sports Parent Emotions: My Little Gladiator
Is there something beyond future-oriented optimism bias that may
explain parental over-investment in youth sports — something specific
to that context? Anecdotally and from media accounts, parents seem to
bring more emotion to their children’s sporting events than can easily
210 See Padaki et al., supra note 204, at 4; Rosenwald, supra note 18; Smith, supra
note 209.
211 See William Hageman, Study Finds That Parental Spending on Kids’ Sports May Be
Misguided, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/living/ct-xpm2014-05-20-sc-fam-0520-kids-sports-cost-20140520-story.html.
212 See Debbie Morrison, How Much Do Parents “Really” Spend on Youth Sports?, SCH.
OVER SPORTS (July 17, 2012), https://schooloversports.wordpress.com/2012/07/17/howmuch-do-parents-really-spend-on-youth-sports/.
213 See, e.g., TD AMERITRADE, PARENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE COST OF COMPETITIVE
YOUTH SPORTS 9 (2016), http://s1.q4cdn.com/959385532/files/doc_downloads/research/
Sports-Parents-Survey-Report_2016.pdf.
214 See, e.g., id.; Adam Shell, Why Families Stretch Their Budgets for High-Priced Youth
Sports, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/
09/05/why-families-stretch-their-budgets-high-priced-youth-sports/571945001/.
215 Kevin Helliker, The Problem for Sports Parents: Overspending. Large Amounts of Money
Can Transform Parental Support into Pressure, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2014, 7:13 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-for-sports-parents-overspending-1399936390.
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be explained by their investment in collegiate scholarships. After all,
researchers have found that some parents’ investment in their children’s
sports causes them to curtail their own work hours,216 or to choose
employment based on a work schedule suitable to facilitating a child’s
athletics.217 It’s difficult to imagine the ledger sheet that justifies this
decision without some independent hedonic benefit to the parent. It
seems plausible that sports parents would readily admit to independent
enjoyment of their child’s participation in sports.
In September of 2018, a brawl broke out among parents who were
supposed to be shaking hands after a peewee football game in Wise,
Virginia.218 Parents got into a physical altercation at a fourth grade
basketball game in Oklahoma.219 Several adults were injured fighting at
a basketball game among seven-year-olds in Ohio.220 A father whose two
children were on the team that lost a championship basketball game in
Massachusetts responded by biting the ear off of the opposing coach.221
It seems that every weekend, a similar story appears in the news, though
maybe none as notorious as Thomas Junta, who beat a parent to death
after a hockey game in which the two men’s kids played on opposing
teams.222 The National Association of Sports Officials reports that 70%
of new referees quit within three years, and their survey shows that the

216 See Tess Kay, Sporting Excellence: A Family Affair?, 6 EUR. PHYSICAL EDU. REV. 151,
158 (2010).
217 Id.; Teresa Arendell, The New Care Work of Middle Class Mothers: Managing
Childrearing, Employment and Time, in MINDING THE TIME IN FAMILY EXPERIENCE:
EMERGING PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES 180-82 (Kerry J. Daly ed., 2001); Dawn E. Trussel,
Organized Youth Sport, Parenthood Ideologies and Gender Relations: Parents’ and
Children’s Experiences and the Construction of “Team Family” 109 (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo) (on file with author).
218 Cindy Boren, Parents Brawl During Virginia Youth Football Handshake Line, WASH.
POST (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/10/03/parentsbrawl-during-virginia-youth-football-handshake-line/?utm_term=.9a4f0b62c70a.
219 Parents, Players Brawl at Oklahoma Basketball Game, OKLA.’S NEWS 4 (Feb. 22,
2016, 6:58 PM), https://kfor.com/2016/02/22/parents-players-brawl-at-]-oklahomabasketball-game/.
220 Vinny Carozza, 2 Hurt at Youth Basketball Brawl in Dayton, DAYTON DAILY NEWS
(Dec. 29, 2016, 1:46 PM), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/hurt-youthbasketball-brawl-dayton/D6y9WJBCGjtQABtGYGsxoI/.
221 Court Upholds Mayhem Conviction in Ear-Biting Case, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 26, 2014,
3:27 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/08/26/court-upholds-mayhemconviction-ear-biting-case/cRDT1YCTfaim5C8Qys2baI/story.html.
222 Fox Butterfield, Man Convicted in Fatal Beating in Dispute at Son’s Hockey Game,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/us/man-convicted-infatal-beating-in-dispute-at-son-s-hockey-game.html.
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main reason is “pervasive abuse from parents and coaches.”223 Eighteen
states have passed specific laws against assaulting a sports official.224
Most parents are able to contain these emotions so that they do not
spill over into violent action. But what exactly are these emotions? A
library of recent coaching and self-help books and articles direct parents
to get outside of their own heads and focused on their child’s
wellness.225 Studies confirm what every parent can observe in other
parents, that “parents have incongruent views to those of their children
with regard to behaviors perceived as exerting pressure and support.”226
The phenomenon is familiar to researchers concerned about
determinants of child enjoyment in sports participation,227 and begs
consideration of the mindset parents bring to risk decision-making.
Research into children’s perceptions of their parents at sporting
events places them into three categories: supportive parent, demanding
coach, and crazed fan.228 The first category is appreciated by children,
the last two are not,229 and the last two align with popular
representations of overbearing sports parents. Indeed, recent research
confirms what any sideline observer can see: parents are highly
emotional about their children’s sporting events.
223 Bill Pennington, Parents Behaving Badly: A Youth Sports Crisis Caught on Video,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/sports/refereeparents-abuse-videos.html.
224 Christopher Reinhart, Laws on Assault of a Sports Official, CT. GEN. ASSEMB. (Dec.
11, 2006), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-r-0747.htm.
225 See, e.g., MARK HYMAN, UNTIL IT HURTS: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH YOUTH SPORTS
AND HOW IT HARMS OUR KIDS (2009); JERRY LYNCH, LET THEM PLAY: THE POWER & JOY OF
MINDFUL SPORTS PARENTING (2016); JANIS B. MEREDITH, 11 HABITS OF HAPPY AND POSITIVE
SPORTS PARENTS (2016); JOHN O’SULLIVAN, CHANGING THE GAME: THE PARENT’S GUIDE TO
RAISING HAPPY, HIGH PERFORMING ATHLETES, AND GIVING YOUTH SPORTS BACK TO OUR
KIDS (2013); Bob Cook, How to Become a Better Sports Parent: Stop Caring, FORBES (May
29, 2013, 1:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2013/05/29/how-tobecome-a-better-sports-parent-stop-caring/; Kelly Wallace, How to Make Your Kid Hate
Sports Without Really Trying, CNN (Jan. 21, 2016, 9:42 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/kids-youth-sports-parents/index.html.
226 Michael A. Kanters et al., Supported or Pressured? An Examination of Agreement
Among Parent’s and Children on Parent’s Role in Youth Sports, 31 J. SPORT BEHAV. 64, 64
(2008).
227 C. Ryan Dunn et al., The Impact of Family Financial Investment on Perceived Parent
Pressure and Child Enjoyment and Commitment in Organized Youth Sport, 65 FAM. REL.
287, 294 (2016) (demonstrating the inverse relationship between child’s enjoyment and
their perception of parental investment).
228 Jens Omli & Diane M. Wiese-Bjornstal, Kids Speak: Preferred Parental Behavior at
Youth Sport Events, 82 RES. Q. EXERCISE SPORT 702, 704-05 (2011).
229 Chris G. Harwood & Camilla J. Knight, Parenting in Sport, 5 SPORT EXERCISE &
PERFORMANCE PSYCHOL. 84, 85 (2016).
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“Sports-related spectator aggression dates back to the crowds
witnessing the gladiators at the Roman Coliseum and spans to present
day soccer hooliganism.”230 Using a model developed to assess other
irrational phenomenon like road rage, a recent study surveying 425
parents after watching their child’s youth soccer game identified a
parallel phenomenon called “sideline rage.” The study found that 52.9%
of sports parents reported being triggered to anger watching their child
participate in organized athletics.231 The authors identify “ego
defensiveness” as a prime culprit in parents’ sideline behaviors, meaning
that parents have too much of themselves at stake in their children’s
sports. A different researcher explains:
[T]he achievements of children in an activity as visible and
highly publicized as sports come to symbolize proof of one’s
moral worth as a parent. Talented child athletes, therefore,
become valuable moral capital in neighbourhoods,
communities, and the subcultures associated with highperformance youth sport programmes.232
That is to say, sports may be wonderful for children, but they are
independently meaningful to parents.
A recent headline in the New York Times, “Why Sports Parents
Sometimes Behave So Badly,”233 references this widely understood
phenomenon — that parents can be irrational about their children’s
sports. The Times cites a New Mexico parental code of conduct that
contains language that many sports parents across the country will
recognize, asking parents to agree that “I will be in control of my
emotions” and “I will remember that the game is for our youth — not
adults.” In no other arena are parents asked to sign codes of conduct
that remind them of this obvious child-centered framework, because no
other arena struggles under the systemic failure of parents to feel and
behave as though this were the case. Yet it is that same parent, the one
who needs explicit reminders to control his emotions and to consider

230 Jay D. Goldstein & Seppo E. Iso-Ahola, Determinants of Parents’ Sideline Rage
Emotions and Behaviors at Youth Soccer Games, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1442, 1442
(2008).
231 Id. at 1445-52.
232 Jay Coakley, The Good Father: Parental Expectations and Youth Sports, 25 LEISURE
STUD. 153, 160 (2006).
233 Emilie Le Beau Lucchesi, Why Sports Parents Sometimes Behave So Badly, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/well/family/why-sportsparents-sometimes-behave-so-badly.html.

2019]

The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk

263

his child’s interest in the game, who legitimizes a child’s exposure to
concussion risk under the Lystedt legislation.
C. Reevaluating the Parent and Consent in the Lystedt Structure
We’ve already established that there are substantial limits to a parent’s
ability to make decision about health risk on behalf of a child,
depending on the context. Given the structure of Lystedt, the form of
concussion risk, the law of parental waivers, and the unique
characteristics of the sports parent, we can address more directly the
potential functioning of parents as risk decision-makers in the sports
concussion context. I contend that in this context, the parental role
under Lystedt rests on flawed premises about parental decision-making.
1.

The Problem of Sports Parents: Leagues Like Parents at Arm’s
Length

One mundane issue raised by the sports parent stereotype is that
leagues and coaches work to build clear boundaries around parents. The
constant small scale negotiation of those boundaries leaves many
parents in fear of being trouble-makers, or wanting to save their capital
for the most strategic interventions with coaches. Conversely, these
issues leave coaches wary of parent communications. The Lystedt
structure offers parents substantial information about what is often a
vague and inconclusive initial diagnosis of concussion. But it theorizes
that parents will be effective intermediaries between coach and child in
much the way parents can serve this role with classroom teachers. Prior
to a concussion, the underlying dynamic of the coach-parent
relationship is that parents want their child to receive playtime. The
post-hit shift, then is dramatic: parents ostensibly want the child not to
play for the child’s safety, but they communicate this concern against
the backdrop of wanting their child to remain in good standing with the
coach and to be a team player — and as described above, often wanting
the latter too much. This already carefully bounded relationship
between parent and coach, complete with rulebooks and codes of
conduct, makes it more difficult or risky for parents to act on concerns
about their child’s post game headache or sleepiness.
2.

Lystedt’s Second Hit Structure Depends on Hedonic Reporting
by the Child of Subtle Symptoms that Are Easily Misattributed

The educational information provided to parents about the symptoms
of a concussion may be accurate, but unfortunately, the symptoms of
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concussion are uniquely susceptible to misunderstanding. In turn, the
possibility of importing wishful thinking and cultural influence into the
diagnosis as a lay person is quite high precisely because of the subtle
and qualitative measures of concussion. Against that already complex
backdrop, the parent is not characterizing her own symptoms, but that
of her child. The parent must synthesize the child’s verbal complaints
and the parent’s observation of the child’s behaviors.
In the moments following a concussion, a child may have very
obvious symptoms, including unconsciousness, inability to pass a basic
mental status exam by identifying the date, year, or location, blindness,
dizziness that makes it difficult to walk, or inability to follow a simple
instruction.234 These are relatively clear, though often the parent is not
present to witness them.
A child may have these symptoms, but more often will not. It is
possible to have a concussion and not know it.235 Some symptoms may
not emerge for days or weeks following a hit,236 and concussions are
considered very difficult to diagnose. In addition to the more visible
indicators above, consider this CDC list of external signs that a person
is concussed: “Appears dazed or stunned; Moves clumsily; Answers
questions slowly; Shows mood, behavior, or personality changes.”237 In
other words, things parents observe about their teenagers, with or
without a concussion, as they silently puzzle through the daily parent
question, “I wonder if there’s anything going on with my teenager?”
One way to find out if there’s something going on with your teenager
is to ask, of course. The CDC provides the list of self-reported symptoms
a concussed child may offer: “Headache or ‘pressure’ in head; nausea or
vomiting; balance problems or dizziness; double or blurry vision;
bothered by light or noise; feeling sluggish, hazy, foggy, or groggy;
confusion, or concentration or memory problems; just not ‘feeling
right,’ or ‘feeling down’.”238 The Lystedt legislation asks the parent of a
youth athlete, ordinarily an adolescent under Lystedt, to observe
whether that adolescent is feeling right or feeling down, is sluggish or
groggy, or bothered by light or noise, and is willing to share that
information with a parent. If it weren’t serious, it would almost be
234 Concussion Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 12,
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/basics/concussion_symptoms.html [hereinafter
Concussion Signs and Symptoms].
235 Concussion, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/concussion/symptoms-causes/syc-20355594.
236 Id.
237 Concussion Signs and Symptoms, supra note 234.
238 Id.

2019]

The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk

265

funny, because teenagers usually say that they’re fine, not just to cover
what they’re feeling, but because they lack the maturity and insight to
meaningfully assess whether they are “feeling right” as their brains and
bodies undergo dramatic change. The symptoms of a concussion sound
similar to some of the symptoms of being a teenager, at least to the
extent a parent can observe and interpret those symptoms on behalf of
her child.
The Lystedt structure is the perfect storm of vagaries: it addresses a
disorder that’s notoriously difficult to diagnose because the symptoms
are subtle, and it relies on the self-reporting of these subtle symptoms
by children, and then invites parents to investigate their child’s hedonic
experience and properly attribute that experience to head injury rather
than childhood, and finally implicitly invites parents to make a decision
about a future of subtle neurological impairment for their child. It’s not
that informing parents of concussion symptoms is harmful in this
context, to the contrary, but it’s important to accurately estimate the
combined efficacy of parent and coach information as the bedrock to a
statutory public policy intervention.
If Lystedt is in function an informed consent regime, it’s essential to
remember that the consent is given by one party on behalf of another.
The unique attributes of concussion may make that particularly
problematic, both because concussion relies on self-reporting of
symptoms, and because those symptoms are so difficult even for health
care professionals to measure, particularly in the absence of baseline
testing, which very few Lystedt statutes require. Parents lack the
authority to waive liability in far more concrete circumstances where
the risk and the waiver language are clearer, yet the decision to allow a
child to participate in contact sports is now in effect a waiver of liability
because Lystedt imparts immunity and because the information can
serve as a building block in an assumption of risk defense.
3.

Parents Are Not at Their Best in the Sports Context

Research shows that along with coaches and teammates, parents
contribute to the pressure youth athletes feel not to report concussion
symptoms.239 While athletic deaths due to concussion are rare, longterm impairment to memory and focus is more common, and increased
risk of prematurely experiencing serious disorders such as depression
and suicidality, multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s
disease, are at stake when parents minimize concussion symptoms. Yet
239 Emily Kroshus et al., Concussion Under-Reporting and Pressure from Coaches,
Teammates, Fans, and Parents, 134 SOC. SCI. & MED. 66, 73 (2015).
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they do, which requires some consideration; after all, parental authority
in general is premised in part on maturity and the ability to engage in
long-term thinking that children lack.
Given the challenge of assessing an athlete’s symptoms and her
readiness over time to return to play based on improvements in those
symptoms, parents need to bring their “A” game to this work. Yet
parents in popular culture and confirmed by research are too often not
at their best in the sports setting. Ego identification and substantial overestimation of their child’s athletic prospects color their risk calculations,
both in exposing their children to primary concussion risk and in
assessing the seriousness of their condition after a first hit. This is not
to say that many parents aren’t sober or even overly concerned about
concussion risk,240 but rather to acknowledge that research confirms
that parents experience intense emotions surrounding their children’s
sports, and those emotions have the potential to distort risk decisionmaking. If over half of sports parents feel anger at some point during a
child’s sporting event, it shouldn’t be offensive to consider whether the
context of their decision-making requires more rigorous supervision.
Recall that most parents find it excruciating to listen to their baby cry
and to nonetheless refrain from picking her up, or at least turning the
car seat around so that the infant can see the other human in the car.241
In part for that reason, state legislatures impose a more sober
perspective on a parent’s decision-making in the infant car seat
context.242 These laws aren’t accusing a parent of bad faith, but are
recognizing that the emotional state of parenting can sometimes
interfere with child welfare in predictable contexts. If parents were not
susceptible to feeling overwhelmed by temptation in the car seat
context, it would be adequate to provide them with full risk information
and allow them to implement the best safety protocol given their own
value system for the child.243 A sports parent may experience the
urgency of the child’s interest in playing, and paired with the parent’s
240 For an argument that parents are too concerned, see Shen, supra 3 at 32-33
(2018). Note that the evidence that parents are too concerned focuses on attitudes, not
actions. Id.
241 See KJ Dell Antonia, Safe, Sound, and Screaming Her Head Off, SLATE (Mar. 22,
2011, 1:26 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2011/03/safe-sound-and-screamingher-head-off.html.
242 See Jin Yung Bae et al., Child Passenger Safety Laws in the United States, 1978–
2010: Policy Diffusion in the Absence of Strong Federal Intervention, 100 SOC. SCI. & MED.
30, 31 (2014).
243 See Sarit Shimony-Kanat et al., Do Parental Decision-Making Patterns Predict
Compliance with Use of Child Booster Seats?, 25 INT’L J. INJ. CONTROL & SAFETY
PROMOTION 53, 53 (2018).
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independent emotional stake in the athletic achievement of the child,
find themselves minimizing long-term risk as against the impulses of
the moment in much the way a parent who turns around a rear-facing
car seat does.
4.

Parents Have No Control over the Rules of Play or the Conduct
of Practices and No Avenue to Influence Them Under Lystedt

To the extent primary prevention is an essential part of reducing overall
harms of concussion to youth athletes, Lystedt is arming parents with
information but not authority to address primary prevention. Arguably,
Lystedt does worse than that. By encouraging parents to focus on secondimpact syndrome, Lystedt creates a defined zone of parental action,
directing concerned parents to contemplate that space, and explicitly
empowering them with instructions in the second-impact context. By
omission, Lystedt minimizes parental agency before a first hit.
In addition, even the highly concerned and informed parent who
worries about primary prevention is presented with a binary choice set
at the beginning of the season: play with the current risk scenario, or
don’t play. This is the same decision parents face with respect to all
recreational waivers, which courts do not tend to enforce. It’s the choice
parents faced prior to child labor laws: put the child to work with
limited education and safety, or don’t, and absorb the economic
consequences. Parents may, however, want to have that third choice,
the warrant of habitability: participate, but with smarter rules of play,
and more conscientious practices. Lystedt cannot operate to achieve
that third way. Other forces will get us there eventually, as public
pressure increases on sports organizations at the international, national,
state, and local levels, from professional to collegiate to youth leagues,
but the Lystedt framework largely disarms parents as an effective force
in that process.
Game changes underway in youth leagues are to be celebrated. Yet
there’s little reason to trust the leagues to act with a speed or seriousness
that matches the state of the evidence or medical advice. Consider the
established medical recommendations around the appropriate age to
begin checking in ice hockey. That recommendation is age fifteen;
leagues are reforming, but not the whole way up to that
recommendation. Public health researchers characterize the problem
clearly:
[T]he American Academy of Pediatrics has recommended that
body checking in ice hockey be limited to players over the age
of 15. Despite this recommendation, most ice hockey
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associations across North America allow body checking as early
as 13 years old. This particular issue reinforces how the culture
of sport in today’s society is engulfed in the idea of performance
and professionalization, which ultimately has a negative impact
on the physical health and well-being of young athletes.244
While a series of unsuccessful lawsuits against leagues in pursuit of
rule changes, including soccer245 and football,246 seem to have
nonetheless energized rule changes, Lystedt separates the individual
parent from these larger forces. If the detailed attention state law has
given to return to play protocols were extended to evaluating rules of
play, we could energize a real revolution in the safety of youth sports.
By immunizing coaches and sports organizations from suit, Lystedt
decreases the pressure these actors would receive from liability insurers
to study and implement appropriate game changes.
Not only does Lystedt render parents less effective as a pressure point
on game rules, but arguably, it uses them to legitimize the status quo.
Parents are not the cheapest cost avoiders, they are not experts in
medicine or in the subtleties of game rules and risks, and they do not
have the power to design around the safety risks even if they had the
expertise. In the scheme of this moment of cultural contradictions,
parents are serving as a fig leaf on the system of youth concussion risk,
and the Lystedt Laws are consistent with that conception of the parent
role.
A serious public health approach to concussion risk would ask what
reduces that risk overall at relatively low social cost, and then
implement the plan uniformly. Whatever answer such an investigation
yields, if that answer performs better than parents at protecting youth
from traumatic brain injury, then it should prevail. The movement to
adopt Lystedt across all fifty states has interfered with the process of
arriving at those optimal prevention strategies by declaring one focal
point of prevention, return to play, and immunizing all other potential
intervention points.

244 Corliss N. Bean et al., Understanding How Organized Youth Sport May Be Harming
Individual Players Within the Family Unit: A Literature Review, 11 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. &
PUB. HEALTH 10226, 10232 (2014); see also Carolyn A. Emery et al., Risk of Injury
Associated with Body Checking Among Youth Ice Hockey Players, J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2265,
2271 (2010).
245 Mehr v. Féderation Internationale de Football Ass’n, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1044
(N.D. Cal. 2015).
246 Pierscionek v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, No. 14 CH 19131, 2015 WL 6550826 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 27, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
The Lystedt legislation is unusual. It is not an explicit informed
consent statute, but it trades on the legal rituals of providing information
and requiring parental sign-off to enhance the sense that risks are
knowingly undertaken. Yet the risks that are undertaken are not fully
explicated to parents or athletes in the Lystedt framework, because the
primary risks of a first concussion are not described at all, and those are
the risks most likely to occur. The Lystedt paperwork feels like waiver
information, but it is not. It is formally second-impact syndrome
prevention information, as it primarily instructs actors on protocols after
a concussion has occurred. Parents do not waive their child’s right to sue
for injury contractually, though they surely sense that they are engaged
in that ritual. Often, unbeknownst to them, that potential liability for
negligent harm to their child has already been removed by Lystedt laws
with the grant of statutory immunity from suit. The information they are
given, though, trains their attention toward post-concussion risks, and
focuses their agency toward preventing a catastrophic but unlikely
second-impact injury. There is almost a theatrical quality to this, with
parents playing a compliant and prescribed role that puts them at a safe
distance from the actual controversy surrounding appropriate levels of
risk for children in youth sports. What role parental voice might have
played in agitating for change in risk levels before the fifty states trained
their focus on return to play protocols, we cannot know. But their value
in legitimizing the status quo, utilizing the great weight of their parental
decision-making authority, should not be underestimated. We must
understand the real oddity of the Lystedt structure and its departure
from the norms of parental decision-making to reveal its functioning. In
their assigned role under the Lystedt laws, parents play an
underappreciated but essential part in furtherance of Lystedt’s status quo
protective operation, one that stretches rather than reflects the
conception of parents in other areas of law.

